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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court's sua sponte dismissal of Appellant 
Bryce Kraus' Petition for Finding of Paternity and Custody. Being a family law/custody 
issue, this Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(I), Utah Code 
(1994). Also, this case was tiansfened from the Utah Supreme Court, giving this Court 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(k), Utah Code (1994).2 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the trial judge err in dismissing the case for lack of standing? 
Legal issue - coiTection of error standard. Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 
P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1993) (where trial judge summarily dismissed case, this Court 
applies Correction of Error standard). Accord, Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 
919 (Utah 1993). Where correction of error standard applies, Court gives no particular 
deference to trial court's reasoning. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 654 (Utah 1995). 
B. Was it error to refuse to require a blood test to determine paternity for 
the minor child? 
Legal issue - coiTection of error standard. Id. This involves interpretation of paternity 
and presumed legitimacy statutes. Sec. 78-30-4 & 78-30-12. This is a question of law, so 
the coiTection of error standard is applied, with no particular deference to the trial court's 
construction. T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App. 1988). 
C. Is a divorce between Paul and September awarding custody to 
September binding on Bryce, precluding him from asserting his rights to his natural son? 
2
 See also, Rules 3, 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
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Legal issue - correction of error standard. Id. 
D. Assuming (a) Biyce is Dreu's father, and (b) he raised him for more than 
half his life, and (c) September was married to Paul but living with Biyce when Dreu was 
conceived, and (d) September divorced Paul with a decree giving her custody and Paul 
visitation and a support obligation, then remarried Paul, then is Bryce entitled to court 
access to establish his paternity, and enjoy custody or visitation? 
Legal issue - correction of error standard. Id. Where there is a dismissal on purely 
legal grounds, a correction of error standard is applied, affording the trial court no particular 
deference. Skokos v. Corradinni, 260 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,12 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
All these authorities are included in Appendix A, and are not set forth verbatim here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
This is an appeal from a final Order issued by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on 
May 16, 1995, which Order* summarily (and sua sponte) dismissed this case for lack of 
standing. That Order was an overruling of an objection to the recommendation issued from 
the bench by Commissioner Michael Evans on February 9, 1995. Commissioner Evans' 
3
 R. 114-115 . 
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recommendation was for dismissal, but on the basis that a prior divorce Decree was res 
judicata as to Appellant Bryce Kraus (''Bryce"), preventing him from seeking custody. 
Bryce objected on about February 15, 1995.4 
B. Course of Proceedings* 
1. The case is a Petition for Paternity, for Custody and to Amend Birth Certificate. 
The Petition was filed December 8, 1994.5 The Petition was served with an Affidavit of 
Petitioner Kraus in Support of Order to Show Cause0 and an Order to Show Cause.1 
2. On February 6, 1995 Biyce filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Petitioner Kraus 
in Support of Order to Show Cause} 
3. Plattsmiers ("Paul and September"), the appellees, filed no response, answer, 
opposition, denial or other paper in response to any of the above. 
4
 R. 56, February 16, 1995. 
5
 R. 2-6. The Petition seeks a finding that Appellant Biyce Kraus is the natural father of Dreu Prescott Kraus 
Plattsmier, a three year old boy, R. 5, together with a grant of custody or visitation, with a request to amend the birth 
certificate accordingly. R. 5-6. 
R. 7-10. The Affidavit was accompanied by a Motion for Temporary Custody, Injunctive Relief and Order 
to Show Cause. R. 11-12. These documents (and a summons) were personally served at the Chubbuck, Idaho home of 
Appellee September Plattsmier on December 14, 1994. R. 13-14. 
7
 R. 15. 
8
 R. 23-54. This Memorandum incorporated a letter agreement between the parties piouding for Christmas, 
1994 visitation with Biyce, R. 29, and a transcript of a Three Month Protective Order action, at which September 
Plattsmier testified on December 23, 1994 R 30-54. 
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4. The Show Cause Hearing was before Commissioner Evans on February 9, 1995.9 
September and Paul appeared personally, without counsel. 
5. Without any oral or written argument or motion challenging temporary relief, 
Commissioner Evans denied the motion sua sponte. He stated simply that because 
September and Paul had divorced (for a short time), the Decree awarding custody of 
Bryce and September's son10 to her was res judicata and binding on Bryce.11 
6. There is no specific minute entiy page in the record indicating the hearing was 
held. However, the docket entiy12 shows the following entiy with abbreviations in original 
on the date scheduled for the Show Cause hearing: 
OSC SCHEDULED FOR 2/9/95 COMM. MSE IS STRICKEN & EVEN 
THOU (sic) COUNSEL FOR DEFT IS NO PRESENT, PLTF'S MOTION IS 
DENIED. 
R. 112. The seemingly haphazard docket entiy does not note the appearances by all of the 
parties, or by the undersigned counsel for Biyce. Id. 
September was ordered to appear and show cause why Biyce should not be awarded temporary custody of 
Dreu, an award of visitation and child support, enjoining September from removing Dreu from Utah and Idaho, or 
denying Bryce access to Dreu, and requiring that if she challenges paternity, a DNA paternity test be performed by the 
University of Utah Eccles Genetics Lab. 
10
 See, Plattsmierv. Plattsmier, Third District Court, Judge Murphy, Case # 94-490406 DA. 
For some unknown reason, there is no minute entiy in the record memorializing Commissioner Evans' 
recommendation or that the hearing was even held. 
12
 R. 112. 
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siiasponte recommendation18, and ordered the entire action dismissed, but based on different 
grounds: she ruled that Biyce lacks standing to assert any rights in the minor child, since 
Paul and September were married when Dreu was conceived and bom. 
12. The Order of Dismissal for Lack of Standing was entered May 16, 1995, and that 
is the order from which this appeal is taken.19 
13. Both Commissioner Evans and Judge Peuler had suggested that to avoid res 
judicata effect of the divorce case, Biyce ought to intervene in that case. Without admitting 
that it is necessaiy, Biyce filed a Motion to Intervene in that case, Plattsmier v. Plattsmier, 
No. 944900406DA. That motion is still pending in that court, Judge Muiphy presiding.20 
C. Disposition at trial court level. 
1. Date of Judgment or Order Appealed from. Judgment, in the form of a final Order 
of Dismissal, was entered by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler in this matter on May 16, 1995, 
15
 Minute Entry at R. 111-112. 
R. 114-115. The Order as proposed was altered by Judge Peuler prior to signature. As submitted it read in 
part that the matter was "dismissed on the basis that petitioner lacks standing to assert paternity, since respondents were 
married (albeit separated) when Dreu Kraus Plattsmier was bom. The Commissioner's recommendation is affirmed." 
The foregoing shows by shading the portion stricken out by the Judge when she entered the Order. R. 115. The lower 
court gave no notice to the undersigned or the parties of the change, and it came to the attention of the undersigned only 
during preparation of this Appeal Brief. 
20
 The Motion to Intervene, to Modify, Alter or Amend Divorce Decree was to be heard on August 28th, but 
has been continued to October 3, 1995, due to the parties having stipulated to have blood usting accomplished, and to 
permit better notice. Interestingly, the Commissioner in that case is also Commissionei \l\ :,ns He suggested (without 
ruling) that intervention may not be necessaiy, since the Decree would no longer be effective. Miice Paul and September 
remarried shortly after the divorce. This is in contrast to his refusal to recognize that fact in tLs case, where he ruled 
that Bryce is bound by that earlier decree, even though he was told clearly that the Piattsmicrs iud reman ied. 
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7. Objection. An objection was timely filed13, and was fully briefed by Bryce1.4 
8. While that objection was pending, Bryce filed an Acknowledgment of Paternity 
with the Utah Department of Health.15 
9. On February 13, 1995, there having been no response or opposition, Biyce filed 
a Notice to Submit for Decision, attempting to avoid the need for a hearing. The Notice to 
Submit was not honored, but rather a hearing was set. 
10. Still neither Paul nor September ever filed a written Answer or any other paper 
in this case, though they were served with the Petition, Order to Show Cause, Summons and 
related documents on December 14, 1994. They are therefore in default. They did appear 
personally at the Show Cause hearing before Commissioner Evans, but have filed nothing 
in writing. However the clerk of the lower court refused on April 6, 1995 to enter a Default 
Certificate submitted on behalf of Bryce.16 
11. On March 24, 199517 Judge Peuler entertained oral argument on the objection. 
Paul and September Plattsmier did not appeal'. Judge Peuler affirmed Commissioner Evans' 
13
 R. 56-57. 
R. 58-67; amended and corrected at R. 71-83, with attachments covering R. 84-109. 
15
 R. 7-8. 
R. 112. The reasons given were the commissioner's finding of no jurisdiction, affirmed by Judge Peuler, 
and claimed defects in service of process. None of those defects was raised by any party; only by the lower court clerk. 
17
 Notice of Hearing, March 8, 1995. R. 68. See also, R. 110. 
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which Order summarily dismissed this case for lack of standing,21 coupled with an argument 
by Judge Peuler that strong public policy dictates against Biyce, whom she characterized as 
a legal "stranger", from invading the "intact family" of Paul and September.22 There were 
no post-judgment motions. 
2. Refusal to Enter Default. Despite failure to answer, the trial court refused a 
request that it enter the respondents' default. See paragraph 10 in section B above. 
3. Date of Filing Appeal. The appeal was filed in the trial court on June 15, 1995, 
stating that was an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.23 Nevertheless, the appeal was 
apparently sent by the trial court to the Utah Supreme Court, arriving June 20, 1995.24 
4. Transfer from Supreme Court. On July 12, 1995 this case was transferred by the 
Supreme Court to this Court for disposition. 
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues on Appeal. 
1. This is a custody case with aspects of a reverse paternity controversy, relating to 
Dreu Prescott Kraus Plattsmier, bom June 15, 1992 in San Diego, California.25 
See, Order of Dismissal for Lack of Standing, R. 114-115 as altered. See footnote 8, above. 
R. 7,8, 10, 11. 
R. 116-117. 
R. 118, letter from Supreme Court Clerk. 
R. 59. 
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2. Respondent September (''September") Plattsmier is Dieifs natural mother. 
Respondent Paul Plattsmier ("Paul") has been a step father to Dieu, and currently claim to 
be his natural father.26 
3. Appellant Bryce is the natural father of Dreu, and Bryce's last name (Kraus) 
is Dreu's middle name.27 Respondents Paul and September now deny Bryce's paternity, but 
September has repeatedly admitted28 that Biyce is Dreu's biological father, which admissions 
can be solidly proved if Biyce gets the opportunity to have his claims fairly aired. And the 
issue could have been determined by the trial court ordering paternity testing.29 
4. While that objection was pending, Biyce filed an Acknowledgment of Paternity 
with the Utah Department of Health.10 
5. September and Paul were formerly married, divorced in September, 199431, and 
very shortly thereafter remarried. The 1994 divorce may have been a collusive effort to 
26
 R 59-60 
27
 R 72 
28 
September admits paternity lepeatedly in videos made in the hospital light alter Dieu s birth, and in videos 
made later, all of which aie available as evidence R 59 She even gave Dieu Biyce s surname She states in a recent 
letter in her own handwriting "You do have t»o Dads. Your D;ukh Paul, and \our father, Brjce. Bryce is jour 
biological father and Paul is yom legal fathei who wanted to (and did) sign \oui birth certificate But now, I have to 
decide where you would be most happy - - w ith us, 01 with Daddv Brvce It's impossible to see into the iiiture Your 
Daddy Bryce is all alone without you I've decided to try letting >ou he with him. He is a good man and father... 
." June 15, 1994 birthday lettei trom Septembei to Dieu R 69 
29
 R 124 
30
 R 7-8 
The di voice Court purported in that case to giant Septembei custodv of Dieu, lequning Paul to pay child 
support to September, as though Dieu Paul's natuial child 
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foreclose Bryce's parental rights. Biyce was not a party to that divorce case, # 944900406.32 
The Findings contained false statements. It is this separate divorce, which granted 
September custody and Paul visitation, that Commissioner Evans (supported by Judge 
Peuler) claimed was binding on Biyce. 
6. Biyce is also step-father to September's other children, Summer and Drai, who 
know him as "Daddy Biyce" or "Dad".33 Biyce, September, their son Dreu and September's 
other children were living together in Biyce's Salt Lake home when Dreu was conceived.34 
7. Bryce has been Dreu's primary caretaker.35 During most of Dreu's 2 lA year 
life, Dreu resided with Bryce in Salt Lake County36, until September spirited him away.37 
8. Most recently, from June, 1994 until November 24, 1994, Dreu lived alone with 
Bryce in Salt Lake County. Neither September nor Paul lived with them at that time. 
9. On Thanksgiving, 1994, September used a ruse about her having a visit with the 
child, and took Dreu from Biyce, who was residing alone with him. Id. Until she took him 
51
 R. 59-60. 
33
 R. 93. 
3 4 R . 9 5 . 
35
 R. 125. 
36
 While there is some dispute about the number of months the children were with the respective parties, 
September admits that they lived substantial time with Biyce. See. e.g. Tr. 9 She admits that until Thanksgiving, Dreu 
has never resided in Idaho. Tr. 11, L. 11 -22. 
37
 R. 40-41. There September admits that the child resided with Biyce in Utah, sometimes with her there and 
sometimes with her living in California. R. 40-42. 
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at Thanksgiving, Biyce was DreiTs primary caretaker. Biyce Aff.38 September unilaterally 
moved Dreu and the other children to live witii her in Chubbuck, Idaho. She began to deny 
Bryce was Dreu's father for the first time in late 1994. 
10. Shortly after the divorce, September and Paul remarried, and then unilaterally 
moved Dreu and the other children to live with them in Hawaii. They continue to deny 
Bryce any contact with the children, or to even let him know of their new place of residence. 
11. September has said that she "would like to have a DNA testing, I am more than 
willing to submit to that. We can have that done as soon as possible I would hope." 
Idaho Tr. 8 & 13.39 The parties had an agreement in principal to have paternity testing 
performed,40 and testing is now believed to be in process. 
12. The only real contact Biyce has been permitted with the children was at 
Christmas, when the parties stipulated that all three children would have visitation with 
Bryce on Christmas day for two and half hours. When the Christmas visit began, September 
suggested that the visit should be overnight. That visit, which was carried out and went very 
well, was memorialized in writing and signed by the parties.41 
13. September and Paul move a lot, often leaving Dreu in the care of others. In the 
™ R. 7-10, 124. 
39




 R. 29. 
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2l/2 years since Dreu's birth, September has resided in Utah, California, Utah again, 
California again, Utah again, then Idaho and now Hawaii. Biyce Aff; Tr. 9.42 
14. Biyce filed a Petition (this case) and Order to Show Cause for custody of Dreu, 
and child support (and in the alternative for visitation). If paternity is challenged, he 
requested that September be ordered to submit to and pay for immediate DNA testing. He 
also requested visitation with the other children, Drai and Summer, and that September be 
restrained from taking the children outside of the states of Utah and Idaho, and from 
withholding access to them from Biyce.4' 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
If not reversed, the trial court will have declared that a natural father who has been 
his child's primary caretaker cannot get access to the judicial system to establish any rights 
or contact with his son. This is tine, per the trial court, even though he has also filed an 
Acknowledgment of Paternity. 
Commissioner Evans ruled sua sponte that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this 
matter, and that the divorce decree between the respondents is res judicata, precluding any 
court action, even though the respondents since remarried. Judge Peuler affirmed the 
recommended dismissal, but based her rationale on strong "public policy" considerations 
42
 R. 38, 42, 44. 
43
 R. 2-6. 
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dictating against allowing Bryce, who she said was a 'legal stranger" to his own child, to 
interrupt the "intact family" of the Plattsmiers by litigating paternity. This she summarized 
as "lack of standing." 
Not only was the court in error, but the cruel result of that error is denying Biyce his 
constitutional rights as a father who has largely raised his son ("Dreu"), and who as a result 
of the mling is entirely denied a father's access. The Commissioner's mling (upheld 
impliedly by the Judge) that a divorce to which he was not a party is res judicata is contrary 
to law and in fact stark error. Bryce has no "standing" problem, and public policy supports 
him, rather than being against him. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Plattsmiers are in default. Despite personal service on September, and although 
she and Paul both appeared personally44 at the Show Cause hearing before Commissioner 
Evans, the September and Paul Plattsmier at no time filed any answer or responsive pleading, 
or even argued orally. This is true even to this date.45 This case is unusual, when it is 
recognized that at the dial court level at least, the victorious parties are in total default 
The appearance by Paul and September was a general appearance, and was not for purposes of any motion 
to quash, dismiss, etc. 
It is acknowledged, though, that in the last few days prior to the preparation of this brief, Plattsmiers and 
Bryce have entered into a stipulation in the lower courts to at least undergo blood testing to confirm whether Bryce is 
really Dreu's father. There is no agreement that the blood testing will in any manner render this matter moot, and no 
party has requested a stay of this appeal. Even the respondents agree that the trial court was wrong and overly hasty in 
denying even the right to determine paternity. 
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Default judgment was appropriate under Rule 55, URCP,40 but was not granted. 
2. The allegations are admitted. This includes Bryce's paternity, the fact he was 
the primary caretaker, that September got physical custody of Dreu only by deception, that 
Paul and September reconciled, making their divorce a nullity, etc. 
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than 
those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the 
responsive pleading. . . . 
Rule 8(d), URCP (emphasis added). This is an issue separate and apart from whether a 
technical default judgment was appropriate. See, Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 
164, 169 (Utah 1971). This issue relates to items being "deemed admitted", and not to 
whether default judgment is appropriate. See also, Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 59547 
(Ct. App. 1992), cert, granted and remand instructions revised on other grounds, 863 P.2d 
534 (Utah 1992). 
Read in conjunction with one another, Utah R.Civ.P. 55(a)(1) and (b)(2) state 
that '[W]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 
has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules,' 'the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor.1 Further, 
when allegations set forth in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when 
not denied in the responsive pleading. 
Stevens, supra, at 595 (emphasis supplied), citing to and quoting from Rule 8(d), URCP and 
4
 "When a party against whom a judgment lor affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his default." 
47 
Murdoch v. Blake, supra at 169. 
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Murdoch v. Blake, supra at 169. Once the court deems the allegations admitted, it then may 
consider the separate issue of whether those uncontroverted allegations entitle the applicant 
to the relief sought. Stevens, supra at 595.48 
Since Paul and September have never formally opposed any allegation in the Petition, 
all of its claims are deemed admitted (even if entry of default and default judgment were not 
appropriate). The truth of Bryce's allegations is deemed admitted here anyway, since 
dismissal was on purely legal grounds. That being the case, the Court must assume the facts 
in the light most favorable to the appealing party. 
This assumption of the truth of the putative father's facts was the approach taken in 
Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1989). There it was the man declared to be 
the father in the Divorce Decree who sought later to establish his lack of paternity. Like 
Bryce here, he proffered notes and photographs as evidence, but, like Biyce, the trial court 
dismissed his action and denied his request for paternity blood testing. 777 P.2d at 500. 
This Court noted,"we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party." Id. 
at 501. The trial court's refusal to allow the testing and a full hearing on paternity was 
reversed, Id. at 504, as it should be here. 
3. The trial court is entitled to no deference. See, Murdoch v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 
Citing Rajneesh Foundation Int'l. v. McGreer, 303 Or. 139, 142, 734 P.2d 87 1, 873 (Or. 1987). 
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22, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971), Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Ct. App. 1992).49 
The trial court here had a veiy small "pasture" within which to roam, and it is for this Court 
to determine anew whether the trial judge has strayed beyond its fence line.50 T.R.F. v. 
Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App. 1988) (this standard is applied to interpretation of 
paternity statutes). 
Here the trial court has denied access to the court system based purely on the 
allegations of Bryce, the Petitioner (now appellant), whose allegations must be deemed 
admitted. So it is submitted that here the trial court may be upheld only if an 
"illegitimate" father who has primarily raised his child, and who has statutorily 
acknowledged paternity, cannot even attempt to establish his fatherhood as against the 
natural mother and her husband, to whom she has been married, divorced (with a 
default decree naming her husband as father), and then married again. That cannot be 
said to be true, and so dismissal of Bryce's petition as a matter of law cannot be sustained. 
"An affirmance is the confirmation and ratification by an appellate court of a 
Cert, granted and remand instructions revised on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah 1992). 
To the extent that a trial judge's pasture is small because he or she is fenced in closely by the appellate 
courts and given little room to roam in applying a stated legal principal to the tact, the operative standard of review 
approximates what can be described as wde novo'. That is, the appellate court closely and regularly redetermines the 
legal effect of specific facts. But to the extent that the pasture is large, the trial judge has considerable freedom in 
applying a legal principal to the fact, freedom to make decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves ab 
initio but will not reverse — in effect, creating the freedom to be wrong without incurring reversal Only when the trial 
court judge crosses an existing fence or when the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely defining the law by 
fencing off a part of the pasture previously available does the trial judge's decision exceed the bread discretion granted. 
State v. Perry, 1995 W.L. 410389 page 3 (Utah App. July 1995), quoting State v. Pena, 869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
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judgment, order, or decree of a lower court brought before it for review."51 What the court 
did here cannot be ratified or sanctioned. It is entitled to no deference, and is plain wrong.52 
The final order appealed from was the Order of Dismissal for Lack of Standing* 
"Whether a plaintiff has standing is a question of law and we accord no deference to the 
ruling of the trial court." West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police v. Nordfelt, 869 P.2d 
948, 950 (Utah App. 1993).54 
4. The trial court had no business dismissing sua sponte. Nobody requested 
dismissal, and this case is a good example of why the trial courts should be waiy of doing 
so on their own motions: they lack briefing or argument, and are more likely to make a snap 
judgment without an accurate perspective of all the facts and legal authority. 
Generally, a trial court may not dismiss an action when neither party has 
sought dismissal and there is no notice or hearing on whether there exists a 
justifiable cause for dismissal. 
Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis supplied).55 In the 
Jenkins decision, this Court continues: 
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 1993), citing Black's Law Dictionary 
(1968 Edition). 
52
 SeeyP!attsv. Parents Helping Parents, 1995 W.L. 357774 page 1 (Utah App. June, 1995). 
53
 R. 114-115. 
54
 Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
55
 Quoting Rubins v. Plummet; 813 P.2d 778 (Colo. App. 1990). 
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Unless expressly granted authority to act on its own motion, a trial court 
must typically limit its rulings to the motions placed before it. A trial court 
has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for determination. 
Any findings rendered outside the issues [presented] are a nullity. Because 
Weis did not make a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court plainly 
erred when it dismissed Jenkins' causes of action without first giving 
Jenkins notice and an opportunity to argue against dismissal. 
Jenkins, supra, 868 P.2d at 1382 (emphasis supplied).56 Cf, Pniess v. Wilkerson, 858 P.2d 
1662-1663 (Utah 1993) (trial court must give notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
dismissing claim for failure to prosecute). 
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties is inappropriate and outside of 
the discretion given the governing tribunal because it encroaches upon the 
advocate responsibility conferred upon counsel. Furthermore, if a party fails 
to raise an issue and present evidence regarding the same, it has waived 
the right to do so. 
Hilton Hotel Pacific Reliance Insiir. v. Industrial Common. Of Utah, 1995 W.L. 339186 
page 4 (Utah App. June, 1995) (emphasis added). In Hilton, this Court declared a "nullity" 
the effort of the administrative tribunal to decide an issue (albeit properly before it), but on 
grounds not urged by the parties. Id. at page 5. 
The interests of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds its role as 
arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would otherwise be dead, it 
not having been litigated at the time of trial. 
Girardv. Appleby, 660 p.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983), quoted by Hilton Hotel, supra, at page 
4; see also, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. V. Utah Stale Tax Comm >?., 847 P.2d 418, 420-421 (Utah 
56
 Authorities omitted were Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc. 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984), and 
the Pruess and Rule 7(b), URCP citations included in body of argument, above. 
App. 1993) ("it was improper for the Commission to sua sponte raise and decide an issue 
that had not been raised by the parties"). 
"A trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented to it 
for determination." Nielsen v. Nielsen, 780 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis 
supplied) (Trial court not authorized to grant relief not requested; especially in favor of a 
non-party57). Utah's leading case on sua sponte action by the courts seems to be Combe v. 
Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). That case stated: 
It is an error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and 
unsupported by the record. The trial court is not privileged to determine 
matters outside the issues of the case, and if he does, his findings will have no 
force or effect. In law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to the 
issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial court has no authority to render 
a decision on issues not presented for determination. Any findings 
rendered outside the issues are a nullity. A court may not grant judgment 
for relief which is neither requested by the pleadings nor within the theory on 
which the case was tried. . . . 
Id., 680 P.2d at 736 (emphasis added, various citations to other states' courts omitted). 
5. The divorce is not res judicata to bar Bryce. It does not estop or preclude Biyce 
from seeking relief in this case. The Commissioner found that the Decree in the companion 
divorce case58 was res judicata, and precludes Biyce from even claiming to be Dreu's father. 
57
 Accord, Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244, 1263 (Utah 1987). 
58
 See, Plattsmier v. Plattsmier, Third District Court, Judge Murphy, Case # 94-490406 DA. 
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On this basis he struck the Order to Show Cause and recommended dismissal of the matter.59 
His recommendation was affirmed. Res judicata acts as follows: 
It provides that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction 
on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, 
as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a later action involving the same 
claim, demand, or cause of action. 
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
It appears Commissioner Evans did not understand or at least did not properly apply the 
standard. Judge Peuler based her affirmance of Commissioner Evans' dismissal on "lack of 
standing" and "strong public policy",60 but did not specifically ovemile the res judicata 
ruling of the Commissioner. 
Since the status and welfare of children is rarely static, that "hyper-technical 
application of res judicata is improper in adjudications where the welfare of children is at 
stake." State in Interest ofJJ.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah App. 1994).61 
6. The characteristics for res judicata62 are not present. Commissioner Evans 
R. 112 (Copy of Docket Page). This hearing has no separate minute entry or Order. 
R. 111 (Minute Entry) and 114-115 (Order of Dismissal for Lack of Standing). 
61
 "Rather, to effectively determine the best interests of a child, a court must be free from the imposition of 
artificial contrasts that serve merely to advance the cause of judicial economy." J.J.T., supra, 877 P.2d at 164, citation 
omitted. This Court in J.J.T. saved "for another day the difficult question of whether, and to what extent, res judicata 
really applies in the context of termination of parental rights," which was the type of case involved there. 
62
 The doctrine of res judicata states that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the 
merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a later 
action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah 
App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
heard no argument and had no briefing (or even a passing reference to the issue) before 
ruling sua sponte that the divorce precluded this action by Bryce. Not surprisingly, he failed 
to advisedly consider that res judicata requires three characteristics, and that none of them 
applies in this case. 
For res judicata to exist, the following must be present: (1) both actions must involve 
"the same parties, their privies, or assignees; (2) the claim that is asserted to be barred must 
have been such that it could have been presented in the first case; and (3) the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction." 
D'Aston v. D Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App. 1992) (emphasis supplied).63 The three 
elements are universal, though sometimes separated into four or five elements, or stated in 
a different order. See, e.g., Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1978). 
They are known as the "Madsen Test."64 
Here none of the Madsen elements is present. Biyce has not had the "day in court" 
to which he is entitled. Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 
63
 See, State Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992). V.G.P. held that 
where a father had been an actual party to paternity case and had stipulated to paternity, the state could not later revisit 
the issue to try to show he was not the •rear' lather. Id. See, Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
64
 The test is named for Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 19SX). That case states the three 
requirements that must be satisfied for res judicata to apply to preclude anything. 
First, both cases must involved the same parties or privies. 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must he 
one that could and should have been raised in the first action. 
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen, supra, 769 P.2d at 247 (emphasis supplied). 
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1993). The parties are not the same, Bryce was not given notice of this case, the claims are 
not the same, there was no dial or plenary hearing, but rather a default divorce, and the issue 
of paternity was not presented to the Court; much less adjudicated. The three prongs are 
discussed individually below. 
7. The parties are not the same. This is the first prong of the Madsen Test.65 Biyce 
was not a party to the divorce case between September and Paul Plattsmier, and was given 
no notice or service of process. D 'Aston, supra, shows that persons other than the mamed 
couple can sometimes be made parties to a divorce. There the parties' adult sons were held 
bound by the Decree of Divorce, because their propeity rights were fully litigated at trial of 
the matter, with their own attorneys present and heard. Id. At 350. 
In this case the Commissioner would saddle Biyce with events in a default divorce 
to which he was not a party and had no notice. Obviously he could not present his 
arguments that he, not Paul, is Dreu's father. Paternity was not an "issue" in that divorce. 
As stated in Sadleir v. Knapton, 296 P.2d 278, 279 (Utah 1956), "Except that it fixed 
the marriage status of the parties thereto and the right of custody of the children, it is clear 
that the divorce decree is not res judicata of the issues in this case because the defendant 
was not a party to that action. Nor is plaintiff in any way estopped as against the 
defendant here by that decree." Emphasis added. The rights determined in a divorce are 
First, both cases must involved the same parties or privies. 
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primarily binding on the spouses; not third parties. Sadlier, Id. at 280. To hold otherwise, 
would be to encourage the mischief or collusion that may have been the intent of Paul and 
September, when they entered into their default decree purporting to determine custody, and 
then almost immediately remarried. There is no bar. Sad/eir v. Knapton, 296 P.2d 278, 279 
(Utah 1956) (Divorce decree is not res judicata as to persons who were not parties to the divorce). 
8. The claims or issues are not the same. This is the second prong of the Madsen 
Test.66 A divorce adjudication "becomes res judicata as to those issues which were either 
tried and determined, or upon all issues which die party had a fair oppoitunity to present and 
have determined in the other proceeding." D 'Aston v. D'Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 
1992). Here there was no trial or plenary hearing, but rather a default divorce. And the issue 
of paternity was not presented to the Court; much less adjudicated. 
Where the two causes of action rest on different facts, and evidence of a 
different kind or character is necessaiy to sustain them, the claims are not the 
same for puiposes of res judicata. 
State in Interest ofllT., 877 P.2d 161, 164-165 (Utah App. 1994), citing Schaer v. 
Department ofTransp., 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983). 
Whether or not Paul and September colluded to file a phony divorce, the Court in 
their divorce had no way to know that anyone else claimed to be Dreu's father, and could 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be haired must have been presented in the first suit or must be one 
that could and should have been raised in the first action. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
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only rely on Paul's and September's false stipulation, which was essentially a fraud upon the 
court. They certainly cannot be permitted to benefit from that fraud.67 
"Claim preclusion is not applicable if the later proceeding is based on a different 
claim, demand or cause of action" than was involved in the first case. State in Interest of 
J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah App. 1994). In JJ.T. it was important that the two 
proceedings examined were of a different nature, with different evidentiary requirements. 
Id., 877 P.2d at 165. The same is certainly true here. 
In this case there was no evidence required to "prove" Paul's paternity in the default 
divorce proceeding. The matter simply was not adjudicated. And since Biyce was not a 
party and his paternity was not alluded to in any part of that default divorce rote proceeding, 
the issue of his being the natural father of Dreu could not have been adjudicated there. 
9. There was no final judgment. This is the third prong of the Madsen Test.68 Here, 
in fact, September and Paul "divorced" but then almost immediately remarried. Since the 
terms of their divorce have no application as between them, it cannot be argued that 
they nevertheless still apply to a legal stranger to that case. 
This case is somewhat analogous to Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). There 
67
 "It is well established that the court has the power to vacate an order or judgment procured by extrinsic 
fraud." State v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 245 P.2d 222 (Utah 1952), citing 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, Sec. 735; Rice v. 
Rice, 212 P.2d 685 (Utah). 
68
 Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Madsen, supra, 769 P.2d at 
247 (emphasis supplied). 
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a former husband who acknowledged in a decree that he was the father, was held not 
estopped to try to avoid support of a child that was not in fact his. The court rejected the 
argument that failure to estop him would prevent the child from seeking support. 
It is true here that the plaintiff consented to be named as the father on the birth 
certificate and that he caused the decree of divorce between him and the 
defendant to reflect that the boy was issue of their marriage. However, that 
conduct in and of itself is insufficient to establish detriment[al reliance]. . . . 
[N]o legal authority is cited for the proposition that plaintiffs 
representations to the 1976 divorce court preclude the boy, who was not 
a party to that action, from obtaining support from his biological father. 
Wiese, Id. at 703 (emphasis added). Not only Bryce, but Dreu have a strong interest in 
reviving their cruelly terminated relationship. 
10. Collateral Estoppel does not apply either. The above discussion related to 
"pure res judicata, or "claim preclusion." There is said to be a second branch, known as 
"issue preclusion", and traditionally known as collateral estoppel.69 This "prevents 
relitigation of issues that have been decided, though the causes of action or claims for relief 
are not the same." State in Interest ofJ.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah App. 1994).70 
Res judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim 
preclusion prevents relitigation of claims that have been fully litigated 
between the same parties, and also precludes claims which 'could and should 
have been litigated in the prior action, but were not raised/ Issue preclusion, 
or collateral estoppel, applies when the issues have been litigated in the 
Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 3X9 (Utah App. 1987). 
70
 Citing PenroJ v. V// Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873. 875 (Utah 1983): Copper Stale Thrift & Loan v. 
Bnmo, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987). 
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context of a different cause of action. In order for issue preclusion to apply, 
the issue in the first case must have been competently, fully and fairly 
litigated. 
Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis supplied).71 
There is no indication that Commissioner Evans or Judge Peuler intended to apply 
collateral estoppel or claim preclusion as a specie of res judicata. This would be impossible 
anyway since, again, Bryce was not a party to the divorce action between Paul and 
September.72 Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985) (Default divorce Decree purporting to 
determine custody not estoppel to later claim the husband is not the natural father); Masters, supra, 
111 P.2d at 503 (claim preclusion/collateral estoppel only applies if the party against whom 
it is asserted was actually a party to the prior action). 
The divorce court had no way to know that anyone else claimed to be Dreif s father, 
and could only rely on Paul and September's inaccurate stipulation, which was essentially 
a fraud upon the Court. There was no final judgment. Here, in fact, September and Paul 
"divorced" but then almost immediately remarried. Since the terms of their divorce no 
longer have any application as between them, it cannot be argued that they nevertheless 
still apply to a legal stranger to that divorce case. 
Omitted in the quote were several citations to Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 
(Utah App. 1987). 
7
 If collateral estoppel type res judicata could be applied because the parties were the same, "we must 
consider not only whether the [earlier] proceeding has preclusive effect because of claims actually litigated, but also 
whether [the precluded party] could and should have brought" the new issues when the earlier case was pending. State 
in Interest ofJ\JT., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah App. 1994). 
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11. The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel illustrates the trial court's folly. The related 
doctrine of "judicial estoppefis similarly inapplicable, but a quick look at it illustrates again 
why the earlier default divorce cannot affect this paternity case. The doctrine of judicial 
estoppel is based on the idea that once a matter has been determined, the parties tend to live 
in reliance on the detemiination and should not later have the issue decided again. This was 
raised and rejected as an alternative to res judicata and collateral estoppel in Masters, supra, 
777P.2dat503. 
According to [the mother], [her husband] cannot contend that he is not the 
children's biological father because in a prior judicial proceeding, the divorce 
proceeding, the court found [him] to be the father. 
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv.. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 
388, 390 (Utah 1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking 
judicial estoppel must show that he or she has done something or omitted to 
do something in reliance on the other party's testimony in the earlier 
proceeding, and will be prejudiced if the facts are different from those upon 
which he or she relied. Id. However, 'there is no estoppel where there was no 
reliance and the parties had equal knowledge of the facts.' Id. 132 P.2d at 
390-91. \n Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 
1971), the court clarified that the doctrine was really akin to collateral 
estoppel and applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which could 
have been determined. The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the 
integrity of the judicial process from conduct such as a knowing 
misrepresentation or a fraud on the process from conduct such as a knowing 
misrepresentation or a fraud on the court. 
Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah App. 1989). Here, preclusion theories are 
being applied by the trial court to sanction a fraud, perpetiated on the court by Paul and 
September in a case where Bryce was not a party. 
September's and Paul's behavior in "stipulating" that Dreu was Paul's child is similar 
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to the conduct of the unfaithful wife in McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 200, 494 P.2d 283 
(Utah 1972). There the parties' original divorce stated that Mr. McGavin was the father of 
their child, but he later learned that it was the product of an extramarital affair. She urged 
that he should not be pennitted to come back and undue what was done; that he should not 
be permitted to show her fraud on the court, because of a claimed res judicata or estoppel 
effect of the original Divorce Decree. Id. at 284. This effort was, of course, rejected73 by 
the Utah Supreme Court. Id., 494 P.2d at 284. 
12. Due process required paternity testing. Yet here there was hardly even a 
hearing and absolutely no briefing on the issue the Commissioner used to deny all relief. 
"The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand 
a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved, [citations omitted]. 
One of the fundamental requirements of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard." 
Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 164 (Utah App. 1992) (a custody jurisdiction case), 
Emphasis supplied. 
The Commissioner denied Biyce his due process rights when, without briefing or even 
Somehow the courts frown on such matrimonial machinations where adult persons seek, 
for their own personal reasons, be it for money or support, or support for spite, to 
illegitimatize an innocent child, who under such circumstances, best would have lenuiined 
birthless. One wonders whether the vernacular appellation anent illegitimates better might 
else apply to others than the infant. 
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 200, 494 P.2d 283, 284 (Utah 1972). 
opposition, he denied not only any custody or visitation rights, but refused to even require 
paternity testing, then dismissed the case. His faulty theory was that the September v. Paul 
divorce action was binding on the issue of whether Bryce is Dreifs father.74 
13. Bryce has standing. Although no one requested it, Judge Peuler ruled that the 
paternity and custody action should be dismissed based on the notion that Biyce lacked 
"standing".75 "Whether a plaintiff has standing is a question of law and we accord no 
deference to the ruling of the trial court." West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police v. 
Nordfelt, 869 P.2d 948, 950 (Utah App. 1993). 
Standing is a matter of asserting the plaintiffs own rights. Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 
713, 717 (Utah 1978). "In order to have standing, a plaintiff must show some distinct and 
palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." West Valley 
City Fraternal Order of Police v. Nordfelt, supra, 869 P.2d at 950; Harris v. Spring\Hlle City, 
712P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1984). 
Clearly Biyce has unique rights to his own (albeit illegitimate) child, especially 
having been a primary caretaker and having filed an acknowledgment of paternity. The 
There was a suggestion by the Commissioner that a motion could perhaps be made to intervene in that case 
and reopen it, and such an avenue may be attempted. The Commissioner denied an oral motion to consolidated that case 
with this one. Bryce retains his right to bring such a motion in that other case at such time as it becomes appropriate. 
My ruling is that the Commissioner's recommendation is affirmed. I frankly think the flaw 
in this lawsuit is that this petitioner has no standing to bring this action. 
I simply don't thing he has any standing to bring this action and I believe the 
Commissioner's recommendation was the correct one. R. 129-130. 
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standing issue in this case is more clearly conti'olled by State in the Interest of J. W.F. ("JWF 
II"), 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990). This was a partial reversal of State in the Interest of 
J.W.F. ("JWFI"), 763 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1988).76 
The JWF cases all arose from the efforts of a putative father (Mr. Schoolcraft) to seek 
custody of his child, after the mother's rights had been terminated. To make a long stoiy 
short, Schoolcraft had been found at the trial court not to be the natural father of the child, 
but he had been married to the mother when the child was bom. The Court of Appeals found 
in JWF I77 that once Schoolcraft was found not to be the biological father, he lacked standing 
to argue for custody. The Supreme Court reversed in JWF II,78 holding that to deny standing 
on this basis was "too mechanistic and, consequently, is insufficiently sensitive to the 
legitimate policy considerations Schoolcraft raises."79 Before proceeding further with the 
discussion of the JWF cases, it should be noted that Schoolcraft stood in the position Paul 
Plattsmier should stand in here; not that of Bryce, whose position is much stronger since he 
is the natural, publicly acknowledged father. 
14. "Public policy" does not rigidly bar Bryce's action. Judge Peuler was greatly 
76
 There is also a "JWF III", State in the Interest of J.W.F. ("JWF III"), 822 P.2d 1218 (Utah App. 1991). 
JWF III contains little or nothing pertinent to this controversy, or which reverses any of the relevant portions of JWF II. 
77
 State in the Interest of J. W.F f 'JWFI"), 763 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1988) 
78
 State in the Interest of J.W.F (VWFII"), 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990). 
79
 State in the Interest of J.W.F ("JWF IF'), 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). 
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concerned (in her unsolicited sua sponte legal theorizing) that Paul and September are: 
an intact family, and I believe that there is very strong public policy against 
allowing a legal stranger to intervene, to disrupt, to invade a family and 
claim custody or visitation over a child where there are both parents in the 
home being a family to that child. 
R. 11 (emphasis added). See also, her comments at R. 7, 8. The court is correct that public 
policy protects the family, but (without the benefit of any motion or briefing) she has 
misunderstood and misapplied that policy. All the reasons for preserving family 
relationships bode in favor of Bryce in this case, not September and Paul. Judge Peuler's 
holding is actually against the controlling decisions. 
We agree that, as a general matter, the class of persons permitted to challenge 
the presumption of paternity should be limited, as he argues, but we reject the 
notion that the legal status of the prospective challenger is the only relevant 
factor, as the court of appeals held. In determining who can challenge the 
presumption of legitimacy, a paramount consideration should be preserving the 
stability of the marriage and protecting children from disruptive and 
unnecessaiy attacks upon their paternity. Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 
395, 518 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1974); Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d at 165, 340 
P.2d at 763. This leads us to conclude that whether individuals can 
challenge the presumption of legitimacy should depend not on their legal 
status alone, but on a case-by-case determination of whether the above-
stated policies would be undermined by permitting the challenge. 
J. W.F., 799 P.2d at 713 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court went on to note that since 
the child there had no expectation as to who his father was, public policy did not deprive 
Schoolcraft, a step-father, of access. He had standing, said the court. Id.80 Clearly the 
JWF II also held that the guardian ad litem had standing. 799 P.2d at 713. This is summarized in JWF III 
as well. 822P.2dat 1218. 
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natural father, here Biyce, would have standing, paiticularly if he has cared for the child and 
been known as his udaddy Biyce''.81 
By allowing her view of "public policy" protecting the September/Paul family (which 
did not really exist until at least last December or January) to override the rights of Biyce, 
Judge Peuler in essence allowed a ubest interest" test to supplant the "fundamental rights" 
of Biyce as a parent. 
Because [the father] had a substantial relationship with the child, the 
termination of his parental rights by application of the paternity statute or by 
a utilization of the 'best interests' standard would violate his due process 
liberties. 
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 914 (Utah App. 1988). T.R.F. goes on in footnote to sum up 
Bryce's mistreatment by the trial court here: 
We are also troubled by the trial court's treatment of. . . the child's natural 
father, throughout this procedurally protracted case. [The father] sought an 
evidentiaiy hearing to determine permanent custody and to determine 
visitation privileges with his child while this case was pending. The trial court 
denied each of [the father's] requests. . . . [T]he trial court continued to 
refuse [the father] visitation with his child even though he had exercised 
visitation privileges with his child the child's entire life. This denial is 
problematic since the court had yet to decide who would have permanent 
custody of the child and it would seem in the child's best interests to maintain 
a relationship with her natural father until his parental rights were finally 
determined. 
Id., Fn. 3, 760 P.2d at 916 (emphasis added). Here the trial court dismissed the entire case 
and struck the Order to Show Cause, effectively supporting September's refusal to allow 
1
 See e.g., R. 93. 
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Bryce to have even visitation with Dreu. 
15. Bryce showed commitment to Dreu; he is not a "legal stranger", JWF II held: 
It may be that no one has the same rights toward a child as his or her parents. 
See, Wilson v. Family Services Div.., Region Two, 554 P.2d 227, 230 (Utah 
1976). However, the fact that a person is not a child's natural or legal parent 
does not mean that he or she must stand as a total stranger to the child where 
custody is concerned. Certain people, because of the their relationship to a 
child, are at least entitled to standing to seek a determination as to whether it 
would be in the best interest of the child for them to have custody. See id. 
799 P.2d at 714 (Utah 1990). The Supreme Court there went on to point out that such 
persons as grandparents, step-parents, and even "next of kin" may be granted standing to 
seek custody. Id. At715.82 
Here, Bryce is the natural father, and he has held a strong relationship with Dreu. 
Until September spirited Dreu out of state last Thanksgiving, Bryce had a stronger 
connection than anyone else, including her. Paul was a step-father who had, until then, 
hardly associated with Dreu. Since then it may be assumed that he has been acting as his 
father. This does not deprive Bryce of standing; it simply means Paul may also have 
standing.83 There should be a full determination of the best interests of the child, rather than 
"[W]hile only parents have vested rights to the custody of children, next of kin, such as this grandmother, do 
have some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody and welfare of the children who become parentless, so 
that they may come forward and assert their claim. . . . [Ijnchoate rights entitle the relative to standing to such a hearing 
to determine custodial fitness." J. IV.F. II, 799 P.2d 710, 715 (cites omitted). 
83 
"In a custody case . . . all things else being equal, near relatives should generally be given preference over 
non-relatives." JWFII, 799 P.2d at 715, citing //; re: Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296, 29X, 410 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1966). 
Here Co-appellee Paul Plattsmier is the non-relative step-father, and Appellant Bryce Kraus is the near blood relative. 
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the trial couit's aitificial and mechanistic84 sua sponlc detennination, which more resembles 
"finders-keepers" than rational decision making. 
There is no reason to narrowly restrict participation in custodial 
proceedings. Indeed, our case law and the legislature's pronouncements 
indicate that the interests of the child are best served when those interested in 
the child are permitted to assert that interest. The question of who should 
have custody of the child is too important to exclude participants on 
narrowly drawn grounds, as did the court of appeals. Those who have legal 
or personal connections with the child should not be precluded from being 
heard on best interests. 
J.W.F. II 799 P.2d at 716 (emphasis added). 
«/. W.F. II went on to note (as had the Court of Appeals in./. IV.R I) that standing to 
seek custody is always conferred if there is a legal obligation to support the child. 799 P.2d. 
at 716. That responsibility is set forth by statute: "Every father shall support his child. . . ." 
Section 78-45-3(1), Utah Code (1995). Similarly, Section 78-45-4.2, Utah Code (1979) 
holds that the natural parent has the "primary obligation of support", which supersedes the 
step-parent's liability. And Section 78-45a-l states: 
The father of a child that is or may be bora outside of maniage is liable to the 
same extent as the father of a child bom within maniage . . . for the reasonable 
expense of the mother pregnancy and confinement and for the education, 
necessary support , and any funeral expenses for the child. For puiposes of 
child support collection, a child born outside the marriage includes a child 
born to a married woman by a main other than her husband if that paternity 
has been established. 
Id. (1990) (emphasis supplied). 
84
 See,JWFII, 799 P.2d at 714. ("Again, we find this analytical approach to be too mechanical"). 
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If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, it may upon its own 
motion or upon motion of the father, order visitation rights in accordance with 
Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37 as it considers appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
Section 78-45a-10.5(l), Utah Code (1994). 
16. What the trial court did to Bryce's paternal rights was unconstitutional. If 
this Decree were left to stand, it would deprive Bryce and his son of all future contact. 
We recognize that an unwed fatiier's interest in personal contact with his child 
acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause when the 
father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood 
by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child. 
Adoption ofC.MXl, 869 P.2d 997 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis added, citations omitted); 
Lehrv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). This 
Biyce has done in spades, and probably more so than has the mother, September. To leave 
this case intact would be way outside constitutional bounds, and downright inhumane 
besides. "Fathers who have fulfilled a parental role over a considerable period of time 
are entitled to a high degree of protection " In re: J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the Utah Constitution, Art. I Sees. 7 and 25, 
"guarantees parents a fundamental right to sustain relationships with" their children. Matter 
ofK.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987). The Federal Constitution provides similar 
protection. Amendment 5, 14; K.B.E., supra, where the unwed father has shown that he is 
willing to support the child and develop a relationship with him. And in such circumstances, 
Appellants Brief, Kraus v. Pluttsmeir, 24 
foreclosing fathers would violate the Equal Protection clause. Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 
L.D.S., 615 P.2d 1250, 1255.85 
Court access should not be denied to Bryce. See, Art. 1 Sec. 11 (Open Courts with 
remedies guaranteed) and Ait. I Sec. 24 (Due Process), Utah Constitution. 
17. The acknowledgment of paternity further strengthens Bryce's rights. He filed 
the acknowledgment, and no one has ever filed an action to terminate his parental rights, or 
to adopt his child Dreu. Such an acknowledgment itself creates constitutional rights to the 
child. Matter ofK.B.E., 740 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah App. 1987). It guarantees him standing in 
proceedings which may deny him access to his child. See, T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 913, 
913-914 (Utah App. 1988), citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-266, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 
2995-2996, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). 
Bryce is quite similar to the illegitimate but biological father in T.R.F.: 
Here, Felan did not sit on his rights for eleven years of his child's life. Rather, 
he complied with the requirements of Utah's acknowledgment statute by 
publicly acknowledging the child and holding the child out as his own from 
the child's birth. He was identified as the child's father on his child's birth 
certificate and baptismal record. He and the child's mother established a home 
together after the child's birth. He continued to visit the child even after the 
parties' separation and he contributed to the support of the child. Unlike the 
natural father in [another case], he seeks actual and legal custody of his child. 
85
 "The relationship between parent and child is protected by the federal and state constitutions-." In re: J.P., 
648P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
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T.R.F v. Felan, 760 P.2d 913, 914 (Utah App. 1988). Here Biyce was openly acknowledged 
as the father of Dr6u until recently. He and Dreu's mother, September, made a home 
together, both at the time Dreu was conceived and for most of his life, until September took 
him away by pretense last November. His surname "Kraus" was put on Dreu's birth 
ceitificate, and when September staited pretending he was not the natural father, he filed an 
acknowledgment of paternity with the Department of Health to protect his rights. 
Such an acknowledgment is a strong vehicle. 
A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compliance with this chapter 
establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationship 
established when a child is born to persons married to each other. 
Section 78-45e-2(l)(a), Utah Code (1995). Biyce is the father, and his formerly illegitimate 
status is changed to parenthood by his compliance with the above statute, with all its rights 
and responsibilities. 
Bryce's acknowledgment was timely, since it may be filed "any time after the birth 
of the child" so long as there has not been a prior consent or relinquishment for adoption,86 
which there has not been here. However, the acknowledgment does not, of course, bear the 
signature of the birth mother.87 In light of the constitutional rights set forth above, any 
attempt in the statute to allow the mother alone to control the validity of the father's 
acknowledgment would be unconstitutional. 
86
 Section 78-45e-2(3), Utah Code (1995). 
87
 Section 78-45e-2(3), Utah Code (1995). 
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18. There is no presumption that bars this action. One of the bases recited by the 
Commissioner for his suasponte rejection of this effort is the claim that since September and 
Paul were married when Dreu was bom (though September lived with Biyce when he was 
conceived), he is somehow conclusively presumed to be Paul's child, notwithstanding 
anything Bryce might assert. Although this error was pointed out to Judge Peuler, she 
adopted it wholesale. 
The presumption of legitimacy is rooted in common law, and is called "Lord 
Mansfield's Rule".88 Even that old rule, which has been considerably eroded by Utah's 
legitimacy statute, is inapplicable here. It only applies to prevent the husband and wife from 
denying legitimacy. See footnote 82. It does not apply to Biyce, who is not a party to that 
marriage (or subsequent divorce, or subsequent remaniage). It was eroded by the enactment 
of Section 78-25-18, Utah Code. That statute states in part: 
In any civil action or bastardy proceedings in which the parentage of a person 
is a relevant fact, the court shall order the child and alleged parents to submit 
to blood tests. 
Id. (1955). See also the statutes which validate the tests and govern their use. Sections 78-
25-19-et seq., Utah Code (1955). Failure of the trial court to require blood testing is a 
clear violation of that statute. 
88
 Goodnight v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591. 98 Eng.Reprint 1257(1777), wherein Lord Mansfield said: "fcit is a rule 
founded in decency, morality, and policy that they [husband and wife] should not be permitted to say after marriage that 
the offspring is spurious." 
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Notwithstanding those statutes, Judge Peuler adopted Commissioner Evans' raw 
misunderstanding of the Lord Mansfield's Rule, which is codified and limited in Utah's 
legitimacy statute, which reads in part: 
Except as provided in Section 78-45a-l, children bom to the parties after the 
date of the marriage shall be deemed the legitimate children of both of the 
parties for all purposes. 
Section 30-1-17.2 (1990). Too quick a look at this language could mislead one to believe 
the Commissioner and Judge were right. However, it speaks in terms of "legitimacy", not 
"paternity", which "may involve two different determinations. Legitimacy addresses 
whether a child was conceived or born in wedlock, while paternity is a question of 
biological fatherhood." Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah App. 1989), citing 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982). The statute is irrelevant, and provides no 
bar or obstacle to Biyce. If it did, he is permitted a hearing to overcome the presumption. 
Further, the legitimacy statute expressly excludes actions under Section 78-45a-l, 
Utah Code (1990), the "Uniform Act of Paternity." This underscores the fact that paternity 
is not controlled in any fashion by the presumed legitimacy statute. 
19. September and Paul have Unclean hands. Their divorce was a fraud upon the 
Court, as alluded to above. Most important was the false statement that Paul was the father. 
In Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 501-502 (Utah App. 1989), like here, the wife lied 
to the divorce court, knowing all the while that it was likely that her lover, not her husband, 
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was the father of her three children. 'Therefore, we find that there are facts alleged on the 
issue of fraud, which, if viewed most favorably to [husband], state a cause of action for 
fraud. As a result, the trial court could not grant summary judgment on the basis of failure 
to state a cause of action." Id. At 502. The same error or worse occurred here. 
CONCLUSION & RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Commissioner's and Judge's hasty sua sponle dismissal of Bryce's claim were 
based on errors of law and an incomplete hearing of the facts. The State and Federal 
Constitutions do not permit the Court to flatly deny Bryce his right to prove paternity and 
litigate for custody and visitation, paiticularly in light of the fact that he has assumed the role 
of father to the fullest throughout most of Dreu's life. 
There is no presumption — much less one that is conclusive — that Paul is Dreu's 
father and Biyce is not. Paternity testing should be accomplished, and Bryce should have 
his full hearing on whether he is entitled to custody of Dreu, and alternatively as to what 
visitation should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted the 7th day of September, 1995. 
Mitchell R. Barker, Attorney for Appellant 
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Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Petitioner 
3530 South 6000 West 
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Telephone (801) 963-6558 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
FOR LACK OF STANDING 
Civil No. 940907741 PA 
Judge Peuler 
Commissioner Evans 
On December 12, 1994 this action was filed by plaintiff Bryce Kraus against respondents 
September and Paul Plattsmier, seeking a declaration of his paternity as to Dreu Kraus Plattsmier, 
together with custody and child support. Respondents were ordered to appear before the Court on 
February 9, 1995. On that date, the natter came before the Honorable Michael S. Evans, 
Commissioner/Judge Pro Tern. Petitioner appeared personally and through his counsel, Mitchell R. 
Barker. Respondents September and Paul Plattsmier both appeared personally as pro se litigants. 
Commissioner Evans struck the hearing sua sponte without hearing argument on the merits, 
6 > _ 
BRYCE L. KRAUS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SEPTEMBER PLATTSMIER and 
PAUL PLATTSMIER, 
Respondents. 
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and recommended sua sponte that the matter be dismissed. Petitioner timely objeGted and briefed his 
objections. 
On March 24, 1995 the Petitioner's Objection came for hearing pursuant to proper notice 
before the Honorable Sandra Peuler, Third District Judge. Petitioner appeared personally and 
through counsel, Mitchell R. Barker. Respondents did not appear, personally or through counsel. 
Having heard argument on behalf of Petitioner, and good cause appearing, this matter is hereby 
ORDERED dismissed on the basis that petitioner lacks standing to assert paternity, siae* 
respondents were iimnicd (albeit ucpuruted) when DrciHfaaus ridllsmiei' was=kefa^ The 
Commissioner's recommendation is affirmed. 
So ordered and decreed this f(p day of May, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
2i ! ^ g A*M^~J 
S**/° 
Sindra N. Peuler, Third District Jud 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 29th day of April, 1995,1 certify that I mailed a copy of the fofegoing proposed order 
to the following persons at the addresses indicated: 
September Plattsmier 
Paul Plattsmier 
4895 Trent Avenue 
Chubbick, Idaho 83202 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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30-1-17.2 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Annulment of 
Marriage §§ 3-42. 
C.J-S. — 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 50. 
AX.R. — Concealment of or misrepresenta-
tion as to prior marital status as ground for 
annulment of marriage, 15 A.L.R.3d 759. 
Concealment or misrepresentation relating 
to religion as ground for annulment, 44 
A.L.R.3d 972. 
What constitutes mistake in the identity of 
one of the parties to warrant annulment of 
marriage, 50 A.L.R.3d 1295. 
Incapacity for sexual intercourse as ground 
for annulment, 52 A.L.R.3d 589. 
Spouse's secret intention not to abide by 
written antenuptial agreement relating to fi-
nancial matters as ground for annulment, 66 
A.L.R.3d 1282. 
Validity of marriage as affected by lack of 
legal authority of person solemnizing it, 13 
A.L.R.4th 1323. 
Homosexuality, transvestism, and similar 
sexual practices as grounds for annulment of 
marriage, 68 A.L.R.4th 1069. 
Key Numbers. — Marriage <£* 58. 
30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of marriage — 
Orders relating to parties, property, and chil-
dren — Legitimacy of children. 
(1) If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any obligations 
subsequent to the marriage, if there is a genuine need arising from an 
economic change of circumstances due to the marriage, or if there are children 
born or expected, the court may make temporary and final orders, and 
subsequently modify the orders, relating to the parties, their property and 
obligations, the children and their custody and visitation, and the support and 
maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable. 
(2) Except as provided in Section 78-45a-l, children born to the parties after 
the date of their marriage shall be deemed the legitimate children of both of 
the parties. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.2, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 65, § 3[a]; 1990, ch. 245, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Nunc pro tunc entry 
of orders, § 30-4a-l. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Lord Mansfield rule. 
Reinstatement of alimony. 
Settlement. 
Cited. 
Lord Mansfield rule. 
The Lord Mansfield Rule, whereby spouses 
may not give testimony which would tend to 
illegitimatize child born to wife during the 
marriage, was adopted. Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 
2d 393, 518 R2d 687 (1974). 
Reinstatement of alimony. 
Authorization by this section of an award 
after an annulment supported court's rejection 
of plaintiff's petition for reinstatement of ali-
mony from first marriage after annulment of 
second marriage. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 564 
P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977). 
Settlement. 
Court which granted annulment had author-
ity to grant wife a $1,200 settlement to enable 
her and her son by a prior marriage to return to 
her native Thailand. Maple v. Maple, 566 P.2d 
1229 (Utah 1977). 
Cited in Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 




Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, Antenuptial contract or settlement condi-
J. W.F v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to tioned upon marriage, enforcement where mar-
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law, riage was subsequently declared void, 46 
1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 955. A.L.R.3d 1403. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Annulment of Paternity findings or implications in divorce 
Marriage §§ 92-104.
 o r annulment decree or in support or custody 
C.J.S. — 55 C.J.S. Marriage §§ 62-66.
 m a d e incident thereto, effect in subsequent 
AX.R. — Custody: power of court which proceedings, 78 A.L.R.3d 846. 
denied divorce legal separation, or annulment
 A l i m o n y : right ^ a i i o w a n c e 0f permanent 
to award custody or make provisions for sup-
 a l i m m fxmneetkin ^ d e c r e e o f a n n u l . 
port of child 7 A.L.R.3d 1096.
 m e g l A L R 3 d 2 g l 
Annulment of later marriage as revivmg „
 r , , , 
prior husband's obligations under alimony de- .. ?«50veiy for services rendered by persons 
cree or separation agreement, 45 A.L.R.3d living m apparent relation of husband and wife 
^QOQ without express agreement for compensation, 
Presumption of legitimacy of child born after 9 4 A.L.R.3d 552. 
annulment, divorce, or separation, 46 A.L.R.3d Key Numbers. — Marriage <&=> 61-65. 
158. 
30-1-17.3. Age as basis of action to determine validity of 
marriage — Refusal to grant annulment. 
If an action to determine the validity of a marriage is commenced upon the 
ground that one or both of the parties were prohibited from marriage because 
of their age, in addition to all of the foregoing provisions, the following shall 
apply: The provisions of this code regarding marriage by a person or persons 
under the age of consent to the contrary notwithstanding, the court may, in its 
discretion, refuse to grant an annulment if it finds that it is in the best interest 
of the parties or their children, to refuse the annulment. The refusal shall 
make the marriage valid and subsisting for all purposes. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Marriage by minors, 
1971, ch. 65, § 3[b]. § 30-1-9. 
30-1-17.4. Action for annulment or divorce as alternative 
relief. 
Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the filing of an action 
requesting an annulment or a divorce as alternative relief. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.4, enacted by L. 
1971, ch.65, § 4. 
30-1-18 to 30-1-29. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 30-1-18 to 30-1-25 (L. Laws 1988, ch. 154, § 4 repeals §§ 30-1-26 to 
1941, ch. 36, §§ 1 to 5, 7, 8; C. 1943, 40-1-18 to 30-1-29, as enacted by Laws 1969, ch. 73, §§ 1 
40-1-22; 40-1-24, 40-1-25; L. 1943, ch. 47, § 1; to 4, and amended by Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 12, 
1945, ch. 64, § 1; 1951, ch. 49, § 1; 1975, ch. 80, relating to marriage by persons under prior 
§ 1), relating to premarital examinations for support obligations, effective April 25,1988. 
venereal diseases, were repealed by Laws 1981, 
ch. 126, § 1. 
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30-3-30. Appropriation to pilot program to cover costs of 
impecunious parties. 
Each party who is unable to pay the costs of mediation may attend mediation 
without payment upon a prima facie showing of impecuniosity as evidenced by 
an affidavit of impecuniosity filed in the district court. In those instances, the 
independent contractor shall be reimbursed for its costs from the appropria-
tions for the "Domestic Relations Mandatory Mediation Pilot Program." Before 
a decree of divorce shall be entered, the court shall make a final review and 
determination of impecuniosity and may order the payment of the costs if so 
determined. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-30, enacted by L. became effective on April 27,1992, pursuant to 
1992, ch. 158, § 14. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 158 
30-3-31. Review of pilot program. 
(1) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt a program to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the mandatory mediation pilot program. Progress 
reports shall be provided semi-annually on the date of implementation of this 
section and on the results beginning July 1,1994. The results shall be reported 
to the Judiciary Interim Committee on a bi-annual basis. 
(2) The Administrative Office of the Courts may make recommendations to 
the Judiciary Interim Committee on methods to make the program fiscally 
solvent, if necessary, including the increase in marriage license fees, divorce 
filing fees, or mediation fees. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-31, enacted by L. became effective on April 27,1992, pursuant to 
1992, ch. 158, § 15. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 158 
30-3-32. Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions. 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote visitation at a level 
consistent with all parties' interests. 
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or 
substantiated potential harm to the child: 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, tUywwd^or 
adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing • » • • • 
to each parent following separation or divorce; ^__ ^ 
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is eti^^j^SS 
responsible for frequent, meaningful, and continuing access1 
consistent with the child's best interests; and 
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have 1 
involved in parenting the child. 
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37: ^ ^ 
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divort&H^ 
adjudicated parents. 
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time penofll 
evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas ^  
the evening before the child returns to school, except fori 
Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. 
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(c) "Extended visitation" means a period of visitation other than a 
weekend, holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), 
religious holidays as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and 
"Christmas school vacation." 
Higtory: C. 1953, 30-3-32, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35, advisory 
guidelines are suggested to govern all visitation arrangements between 
parents. These advisory guidelines include: 
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are 
preferable to a court-imposed solution; 
(2) the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity 
and stability of the child's life; 
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter visits of greater 
frequency or other arrangements consistent with the child's best interests 
for children under age 5; otherwise the visitation schedule as provided in 
Section 30-3-35 shall apply; 
(4) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child 
available to attend family functions induing funerals, weddings, family. 
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant 
events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may 
inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule; 
(5) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified 
and return the child at the times specified, and the child's regular school 
hours shall not be interrupted; 
(6) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation at the 
time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or 
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the 
time he is returned; 
(7) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reason-
ably accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the 
visitation allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the 
standardized visitation provided in Section 30-3-35;; 
(8) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reason-
ably accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of 
exercising visitation; 
(9) neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld due to either 
parent's failure to comply with a court-ordered visitation schedule; 
(10) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and 
community functions in which the child is participating or being honored, 
and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate 
fully; 
(11) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school 
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records and 
shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a 
medical emergency; 
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(12) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and 
telephone number within 24 hours of any change; 
(13) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact 
during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child; 
(14) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than 
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in 
allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care; 
(15) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the 
name, current address, and telephone number of the other parent and 
shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good 
cause orders otherwise; and 
(16) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious 
holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a 
religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the 
right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-33, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 3. Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 
30-3-34. Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may 
establish a visitation schedule consistent with the best interests of the child. 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the visita-
tion schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 shall be presumed to be in the best 
interests of the child. The visitation schedule shall be considered the minimum 
visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled 
unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The presumption may be rebutted based upon a finding of the court including 
any of the following criteria: 
(a) visitation would endanger the child's physical health; 
(b) visitation would significantly impair the child's emotional develop-
ment; 
(c) a substantiated allegation of child abuse exists; 
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills; 
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate 
food and shelter for the child during periods of visitation; 
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of 
sufficient maturity; 
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure 
youth corrections facility, or an adult corrections facility; and 
(h) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best inteiwS 
of the child. 
(3) Once the visitation schedule has been established, the parties mayl** 
alter the schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-34, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 
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30-3-35. Minimum schedule for visitation. 
(1) The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, 
beginning with kindergarten. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule 
shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent 
and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or 
the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m; 
(b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry 
of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each 
year; 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes 
shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend 
visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncusto-
dial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that 
school day; 
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the 
total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from 
school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be 
entitled to this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial 
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 
1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) New Year's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
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(iv) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 
p.m. on the holiday; 
(v) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. 
weekend beginning at 6 p.m on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vii) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(viii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until 
Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(ix) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined 
in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. 
until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally 
divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for 
purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended visitation shall be Vi of the vacation time for year-round school 
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-35, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 5. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch 131 
30-3-36. Special circumstances. 
(1) When visitation has not taken place for an extended period of time and 
the child lacks an appropriate bond with the noncustodial parent, both parents 
shall consider the possible adverse effects upon the child and gradually 
reintroduce an appropriate visitation plan for the noncustodial parent. 
(2) For emergency purposes, whenever the child travels with either parent, 
all of the following will be provided to the other parent: 
(a) an itinerary of travel dates; 
(b) destinations; 
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(c) places where the child or traveling parent can be reached; and 
(d) the name and telephone number of an available third person who 
would be knowledgeable of the child's location. 
(3) Unchaperoned travel of a child under the age of five years is not 
recommended. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-36, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 
30-3-37. Relocation. 
(1) When either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles 
or more from the residence specified in the court's decree, that parent shall 
provide reasonable advance written notice of the intended relocation to the 
other parent. 
(2) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own motion, 
schedule a hearing with notice to review the visitation schedule as provided in 
Section 30-3-35 and make appropriate orders regarding the visitation and 
costs for visitation transportation. 
(3) In determining the visitation schedule and allocating the transportation 
costs, the court shall consider: 
(a) the reason for the parent's relocation; 
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents in exercising 
visitation; 
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and 
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and relevant. 
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order the parent intending 
to move to pay the costs of transportation for: 
(a) at least one visit per year with the other parent; and 
(b) any number of additional visits as determined equitable by the 
court. 
(5) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order uninterrupted 
visitation with the noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during 
extended visitation, except if the court finds it is not in the best interests of the 
child. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-37, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 7. Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 




30-4-1. Action by spouse — Grounds. 30-4-4. Restraining disposal of property. 
30-4-2. Procedure — Venue. 30-4-5. Rights and remedies — Imprison-
30-4-3. Custody and maintenance of chil- ment of husband or wife. 
dren — Property and debt division 
— Support payments. 
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78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing 
fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment 
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of elec-
tion. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial 
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per 
annum or fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three 
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection 
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge 
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties 
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. ficeof a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen- minor stylistic changes, 
tence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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(b.) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h> appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
' (i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Historv: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, in-
serted subsection designations (a) and (b) in 
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local 
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "in-
formal adjudicative proceedings of the agen-
cies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" 
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsec-
tion (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb) 
to (2Xh) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added 
"except those from the small claims depart-
ment of a circuit court" at the end of Subsec-
tion (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 210, effective 
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and re-
designated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsec-
tion (2)(i). 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote 
the phrase before "except" which had read "the 
final orders and decrees of state and local agen-
cies or appeals from the district court review of 
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other 
provision of law" at the end of Subsection 
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); desig-
nated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as 
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and substituted 
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capi-
tal degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g), 
which read "appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal 
conviction, except those involving a first de-
gree or capital felony" and made punctuation 
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective 
April 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision desig-
nation (i) in Subsection (2Kb) and added Sub-
section (2)(lb)(ii), and made related stylistic 
changes. 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "dis-
trict court" in Subsection (2Kf). 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 
39-6-16. 
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78-25-18. Blood tests for child and alleged parents in civil 
actions and bastardy proceedings in which par-
entage is a relevant fact. 
In any civil action or in bastardy proceedings in which the parentage of a 
person is a relevant fact, the court shall order the child and alleged parents to 
submit to blood tests. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Uniform Act on Pa-
ternity, blood tests, §§ 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10. 
ANALYSIS 
Leukocyte antigen tests. 
—Admissibility. 
—Standards. 
Right to tests. 
—Divorce action. 
Cited. 
Leukocyte antigen tests. 
—Admissibility. 
The basic principles upon which human leu-
kocyte antigen tests for determining paternity 
are founded have now received general accep-
tance in the scientific community and are ad-
missible if specified standards are met. Kofford 
v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987). 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, 
J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to 
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law, 
1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 955. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Court appointment of 
expert witnesses, Rules of Evidence, Rule 706. 
—Standards. 
Standards for admission of human leukocyte 
antigen tests held not to have been satisfied. 
See Martinez v. Lovato, 744 P.2d 1364 (Utah 
1987); Salzetti v. Nichols, 744 P.2d 1362 (Utah 
1987). 
Right to tests. 
—Divorce action. 
Husband denying paternity of child born 
during marriage was entitled to blood tests in 
divorce action. Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 
(Utah 1986). 
Cited in State ex rel. J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1990). 
A.L.R. — Blood grouping tests, 43 A.L.R.4th 
579. 
78-25-19. Blood test — Who to make. 
The test may be made by no more than three qualified examiners of blood 
types, not restricted to physicians, who shall be appointed by the court. The 
examiner may not be informed of the identity of any party to the action in 




78-25-20. Examiner as witness. 
The court shall call the examiner as a witness to testify to his findings, and 
the examiner is subject to cross-examination by the parties, except that the 
order for blood tests may direct that the testimony of the examiner and cross-
examination be taken by deposition as provided by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 3. 
78-25-21. Admissibility of results in evidence. 
The results of the tests shall be received in evidence where the conclusion of 
all examiners, as disclosed by the tests, is that the alleged father is not the 
actual father of the child, and the question of paternity shall be so resolved. If 
the examiners disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be 
submitted to a jury duly impaneled. If the examiners conclude that the blood 
tests show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this 
evidence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency 
of the blood type. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 4; 1969, ch. 257, 
§ 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Standards. 
T . :. . . Standards for admission of human leukocyte 
Leukocyteantigen tests.
 a n t i g e n ^ h e W ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ 
-S^^da S e e M a r t i n e z v l x ) v a t 0 ' 7 4 4 P 2 d 1 3 6 4 < u t a h 
Standard of proof. 1987)» S a l z e t t i v ' N i c h o l s> 7 4 4 P 2 d 1 3 6 2 < U t a h 
Cited. 1987). 
Leukocyte antigen tests. Standard of proof. 
Admissibility '^ne P r e P ° n d e r a n c e of the evidence standard 
The basic principles upon which human leu- i s t h e standard of proof that controls in pater-
kocyte antigen tests for determining paternity m t y ^^^ Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343 
are founded have now received general accep- (Utah 1987). 
tance in the scientific community and are ad-
missible if specified standards are met. Kofford
 m , 1 Q Q m ' 
v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987). i U t a n i y y u ; * 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to § 118. 
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law, C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93. 
1989 B Y U L Rev 955 Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children *= 
44, 45, 53. 
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78-25-22. Court may resolve parentage against party r« 
fusing to submit to blood tests. 
The court may resolve the question of parentage against a party who r< 
fuses to submit to blood tests ordered by the court despite the weight of othe 
evidence. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 5. 
78-25-23. Costs of examination. 
The court shall determine the reasonable compensation to be paid to a 
examiner appointed by the court, and, in its discretion, may order that th 
parties pay the costs in such proportions as it shall prescribe and may ord€ 
that the proportion of any party shall be paid by the county in which th 
action is brought. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 6. 
78-25-24. Reserved. 
78-25-25. Patients' records — Inspection and copying b] 
attorneys. 
Whenever an attorney-at-law duly licensed to practice in the state of Utal 
is authorized to represent the interest of a patient of any physician and sur 
geon, dentist, osteopathic physician, registered nurse, psychologist, chiroprac 
tor, or a licensed hospital and that attorney desires to examine or to obtaii 
copies of any of the patient's records in the custody or control of such person o 
hospital, those records shall be made available, at the regular place of busi 
ness of the person or hospital having custody or control thereof, for inspectioi 
and copying by the attorney if he presents to such person or hospital a writtei 
authorization signed and acknowledged by the patient before a notary public 
or in the case of a minor, by a parent or guardian, or in the case of a deceasec 
patient, by the personal representative or an heir. Such records shall remair 
in the possession of the person or hospital having custody or control thereoi 
and the attorney shall pay, as part of the costs advanced on behalf of his 
client, for all copies made at his request. 
History: C. 1953, 78-25-25, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 213, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain 
Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
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History: C. 1953, 78-30-4.6, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 245, § 10. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. —• Laws 1990, ch. 245 be-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Judicial termination of rights. elty, neglect or desertion within former 
Juvenile court order placing children with § 78-30-4 so as to render parents' consent to 
the state department of public welfare (now adoption unnecessary; not every judicial depri-
Department of Social Services) for "foster home vation of custody is a permanent deprivation, 
care, treatment, and supervision" and requir- Deveraux' Adoption v. Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30, 
ing father to pay for such care was not a judi- 268 P.2d 995 (1954). 
cial deprivation of custody on account of cru-
78-30-4.7. When notice of petition required — Manner of 
service — Waiver. 
(1) Notice of pendency of an adoption proceeding shall be served on all of 
the following by the petitioner at least 30 days prior to the final dispositional 
hearing: 
(a) any person, agency, or institution whose consent or relinquishment 
is required under Section 78-30-4.1 unless those rights have been termi-
nated by waiver, relinquishment, consent, or judicial termination; 
(b) any person who has filed a notice of paternity, acknowledging pa-
ternity of the child, with the state registrar of vital statistics in the De-
partment of Health; the sole purpose of notice under this subsection is to 
enable the person served to present evidence to the court relating to the 
best interests of the child, and regarding whether that person's consent to 
the adoption is required under Section 78-30-4.1; 
(c) the legally appointed custodian or guardian of the adoptee; 
(d) the spouse of any petitioner who has not joined in the petition; and 
(e) the spouse of the adoptee. 
(2) The notice required by this section shall specifically state that the per-
son served must respond to the petition within 30 days of service if he or she 
intends to contest the adoption. 
(3) Service of notice under this section shall be made as follows: 
(a) Service on a person whose consent is necessary under this chapter 
shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. If service is by publication, the court shall designate the con-
tent of the notice regarding the identity of the parties. The notice may not 
include the name of the person or persons seeking to adopt the adoptee. 
(b) As to any other person for whom notice is required under Subsec-
tion (1), service by certified mail, return receipt requested, is sufficient. If 
that service cannot be completed after two attempts, the court may issue 
an order providing for service by publication, posting, or by any other 
manner of service. 
(c) Notice to a person who has filed his notice of paternity with the 
state registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health shall be 
served by certified mail, return receipt requested, at the last address filed 
with the registrar. 
(4) The notice required by this section may be waived in writing by the 
person entitled to receive notice. 
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(5) Proof of service of the notice on all persons for whom notice is required 
by this section shall be filed with the court before the final dispositional 
hearing on the adoption, or before any contested hearing pursuant to Section 
78-30-4.10. 
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the notice of an 
adoption proceeding nor any process in that proceeding may be required to 
contain the name of the person or persons seeking to adopt the adoptee. 
History: C. 1953, 78-30-4.7, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 245, § 11. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 245 be-
78-30-4A Filing requirements — Children born outside of 
marriage. 
(1) Any person who is the father or claims to be the father of a child born 
outside of marriage may file notice of his claim of paternity and of his willing-
ness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability with the state 
registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health. The Department of 
Health shall provide forms for the purpose of filing the notices of paternity 
described in this section. Forms shall be made available by the department, in 
the office of the county clerk in each county, in every hospital, as defined in 
Subsection 26-21-2(9), and in every licensed child placing agency. 
(2) The notice may be filed prior to the birth of the child but must be filed 
prior to the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child placing agency or 
prior to the filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed 
the child for adoption. The notice shalfBe signed by the person filing and shall 
include his name and address, the name and last known address of the birth 
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and year 
of the expected birth of the child. The person who files a notice under this 
section shall notify the registrar of vital statistics of any change of his ad-
dress. The Department of Health shall maintain a confidential registry for 
this purpose. 
(3) The Legislature finds that a certain degree of finality is necessary in 
order to facilitate the state's interest in expediting the adoption of young 
children and in protecting the rights and interests of the child, the birth 
mother, and the adoptive parents. Therefore, any putative father who fails to 
file his notice of paternity is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining 
any action to assert any interest in the child unless he proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that: 
(a) it was not possible for him to file a notice of paternity within the 
period of time specified in Subsection (2); 
(b) his failure to file a notice of paternity was through no fault of his 
own; and 
(c) he filed a notice of paternity within 10 days after it became possible 
for him to file. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 78-30-4.1(d), failure to file a timely 
notice of paternity shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of any right 
to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for adoption of the child, 
and the consent of that person to the adoption of the child is not required. 
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(5) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born outside of mar-
riage, if there is no showing that a putative father has consented to or waived 
his rights regarding the proposed adoption, it shall be necessary to file with 
the court, prior to its entering a final decree of adoption, a certificate from the 
Department of Health, signed by the state registrar of vital statistics, stating 
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from putative 
fathers of children born outside of marriage and that no filing has been found 
pertaining to the father of the child in question. 
History: C. 1953, 78-30-4.8, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 245, § 12. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 245 be-
came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Compiler's Notes. — The reference to Sub-
section 26-21-2(9) in Subsection (1) probably 
should be to Subsection 26-21-2(10), "Health 
Care Facility." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Wrongful termination of parental rights. 
Constitutionality. 
Former Subsection 78-30-4(3), which was 
similar to this section, was held not to deny the 
father of an illegitimate child equal protection 
of the laws. Ellis v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 615 
P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 
Where the unmarried father of a child filed a 
paternity claim after placement of the child 
with adoption service, it was not a denial of his 
constitutional right of due process to fail to 
give actual notice of the procedural filing re-
quirement. Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 
P.2d 753 (Utah 1984). 
For case upholding termination of unwed 
father's rights under former Subsection 
78-30-4(3), which was similar to this section, 
against claims that termination violated due 
process and equal protection, and finding state 
action present in placement by private agency, 
see Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 761 P.2d 
932 (Utah Ct. App.), aflPd, 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 
1990). 
For case establishing due process require-
ments relating to notice of paternity filing 
(now found in Subsection (3) of this section), 
see Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep't of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 
1250 (Utah 1980). 
Wrongful termination of parental rights. 
Termination of a non-resident father's pa-
rental rights to his illegitimate son violated 
due process, where although a petition for 
adoption was filed two days prior to the fa-
ther's filing of a notice of paternity, all parties 
were distinctly aware of the father's intent and 
desire to rear the child, and the record indi-
cated that the mother's family deliberately 
withheld information in order to avoid poten-
tial "problems" with the father, who they knew 
would obstruct the adoption. In re Baby Boy 
Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, 
The Putative Father's Due Process Rights to 
Notice and a Hearing: In re Baby Boy Doe, 
1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1081. 
78-30-4.9. Custody pending final decree. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by the court, once a petitioner has re-
ceived the adoptee into his home and a petition for adoption has been filed, the 
petitioner is entitled to the custody and control of the adoptee and is responsi-
ble for the care, maintenance, and support of the adoptee, including any neces-
sary medical or surgical treatment, pending further order of the court. 
(2) Once a child has been placed with, relinquished to, or ordered into the 
custody of a licensed child placing agency for purposes of adoption, the agency 
shall have custody and control of the child and is responsible for his care, 
maintenance, and support. The agency may delegate the responsibility for 
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78-45-4. Duty of woman. 
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support her husband 
when he is in need. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 4. 
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport 
of children, § 76-7-201. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 





Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
Parents are "duty-bound" to support their 
children; however, the extent of that duty is 
not without limitation, and where the question 
of child support has been submitted to a court 
of competent jurisdiction and a ruling thereon 
has been obtained, the more general statutory 
duty of support becomes circumscribed by the 
more specific duty imposed by the court. In re 
C.J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah 1983). 
—Transfer. 
A parent cannot rid herself of her duty to 
support her children by purporting to transfer 
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v. 
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
The fact that the wife in a divorce proceeding 
is not required to pay support, neither termi-
nates the children's right, nor obviates the 
mother's responsibility, for such support as 
may be determined at some future time. Wood-
ward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to 
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 
859. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband 
and Wife § 334; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and 
Child § 54. 
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 48; 
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 54. 
A.L.R. — Liability of parent for support of 
child institutionalized by juvenile court, 59 
A.L.R.3d 636. 
Wife's possession of independent means as 
affecting her right to child support pendente 
lite, 60 A.L.R.3d 832. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «=» 4; 
Parent and Child *=» 3.1(3). 
78-45-4.1. Duty of stepparent to support stepchild — Ef-
fect of termination of marriage or common law 
relationship. 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural or 
adoptive parent is required to support a child. Provided, however, that upon 
the termination of the marriage or common law relationship between the 
stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive parent the support obligation 
shall terminate. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.1, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 131, § 2; 1980, ch. 42, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
of this title. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
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6 section is set out as reconciled by the Federal Law. — Title IV-D of the federal 
of Legislative Research and General Social Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. 
3el. § 651 et seq. 
15-3. Duty of man. 
Every father shall support his child; and every man shall support his 
when she is in need. 
Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 
>-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and 
lecessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are charge-
ible upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of 
he parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses 
lescribed in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
ory: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 3; 1977, ch. ment, effective May 1,1995, added Subsection 
3; 1991, ch. 143, § 1; 1995, ch. 175, § 3. (2). 
indment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
R. — Sexual partner's tort liability to Parent's child support Liability as affected by 
artner for fraudulent misrepresentation other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation re-
ng sterility or use of birth control result- garding sterility or use of birth control, or 
>regnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301. refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 337. 
5-4. Duty of woman. 
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support her husband 
he is in need. 
Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 
7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and 
pessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are charge-
)le upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of 
,e parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses 
scribed in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
ry: L. 1957, ch. 110, 5 4; 1995, ch. ment, effective May 1,1995, added Subsection 
I. (2). 
idment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
in Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah 
1993). 
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(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrativei 
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that 
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court on 
tive agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the^o^ 
result in a tax benefit to that parent. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.21, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 10949H 
1994, ch. 118, § 22. makes the act effective on Jnfr lg f l 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the ttt^jH 
office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicahtoS 
on behalf of: 
(i) the Department of Human Services; _ 
(ii) any other department or agency of this state that 
public assistance, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-303 (3),-
the right to recover public assistance; or 
(iii) the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of support a 
obligor, 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office 
payment of the obligor's support obligation, the attorney 
county attorney of the county of residence of the obligee shall 
office. 
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file a pleading, or 
written stipulation to the court, without complying with Sul 
if the purpose or effect of the action, pleading, or stipulation is 
(i) establish paternity; 
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation; 
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of payment of su] 
(iv) recover support due or owing. 
(b) (i) When taking an action described in Subsection (2XaX' 
must file an affidavit with the court at the time the 
commenced, the pleading is filed, or the stipulation is 
stating whether child support services have been or are 
vided under Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.," 
et seq., on behalf of a child who is a subject of the action, pi 
stipulation. 
(ii) If child support services have been or are being provide^ 
Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 « fc " 
person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a copy of the pT 
stipulation to the Office of the Attorney General, Child 
Division. 
(iii) If notice is not given in accordance with this sul 
office is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, or 
mise rendered in the action. 
(c) If IV-D services have been or are being provided, that 
join the office as a party to the action, or mail or deliver a written 
to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division 
office to join as a party to the action. A copy of that request, 
proof of service, shall oe filed with the court. The office shall be 
sented as provided in Subsection (l)(b). 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-2 
Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has 
ttorney-client relationship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out 
iuties under this chapter. 
itory: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 9; 1975, ch. 96, 
1977, ch. 145, § 11; 1982, ch. 63, § 2; 
ch. 62, S 23; 1990, ch. 183, § 59; 1994, 
40, ! 15; 1995, ch. 258, § 15. 
endmenl: Notes. — The 1994 amend-
effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec-
2)(a) which read "A person may not com-
e any action or file a pleading to establish 
adify a support obligation or to recover 
>rt due or owing, whether under this chap-
r any other applicable statute, without 
an affidavit with the court at the time the 
i is commenced or the pleading is filed 
lg whether public assistance has been or is 
: provided on behalf of a dependent child of 
erson commencing the action or filing the 
ling*; added the designation for Subsection 
i and the second sentence in the subsec-
redesignated former Subsection (2Kb) as 
ection (2)(c) and added the language be-
ginning "or mail or deliver" at the end of the 
first sentence and inserted the second sentence 
therein; deleted former Subsection (3) which 
read "As used in this section 'office' means the 
Office of Recovery Services within the Depart-
ment of Human Services"; and added Subsec-
tion (3). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, 
substituted "child support services have been 
or are being provided under Part IV of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 et 
seq." for "public assistance has been or is being 
provided" in Subsection (2XbXi) and (2XbXii); 
added "of the Attorney General, Child Support 
Division" at the end of Subsection (2XbXii) and 
in Subsection (2Xc); added Subsection 
(2)(bXiii); substituted "IV-D services have been 
or are" for "public assistance has been or is" in 
Subsection (2Xc); and made numerous stylistic 
changes. 
CHAPTER 45a 




Determination of paternity — 






45a-2. Determination of paternity 
ment. 
Authority for genetic testing. 
Effect of genetic test results. 
Visitation rights of father. 
— Effect — Enforce-
L) Paternity may be determined upon: 
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public 
authority chargeable by law with the support of the child; or 
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with 
Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act. 
2) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be 
breed in the same or other proceedings by: 
(a) the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or may 
furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, 
necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
Cistory: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch. 
», § 23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2. 
intendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
nt, effective May 2, 1994, designated the 
it sentence as Subsection (1), adding Subsec-
tion (1Kb), and designated the second sentence 
as Subsection (2), making related stylistic 
changes and inserting "or any other state" in 
the introductory language. 
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78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All 
remedies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confine-
ment for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for 
legitimate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies 
under Title 77, Chapter 31, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
are available for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
(2) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and 
the Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee 
or in its own behalf, pursuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
to enforce that right of support against the obligor. 
(b) The provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, apply in all actions by the 
department. 
(c) Whenever the department commences an action under this chapter, 
it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the 
county where the obligee resides to represent the department. Neither the 
attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has an attorney-
client relationship with the obligee or the obligor, in carrying out his 
responsibilities under this chapter. 
(3) The court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees in the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknowl-
edgment of paternity. 
(4) The provisions of Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, apply to 
paternity actions commenced under this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, under this act" for "a court action is commenced 
!aol; l u9 0 , Ch* 1 8 3 , § 6 0 ; 1 9 9 2 , c h u 160» S 2 ; b ? t h e s t a t e Department of Human Services" in 
1993, ch. 137, § 16; 1994, ch. 140, § 16. that subsection; and made stylistic changes 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- throughout the section, 
ment, effective July 1, 1992, in Subsection (1), The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
divided the former first sentence into two sen- deleted the (3) designation formerly before the 
tences, substituted "action to establish pater- present last sentence in Subsection (2) and 
nity* for "action under this act* at the end of the added present Subsection (3). 
present first sentence, and added the title and The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
chapter citation to the reference in the last subdivided Subsection (2); substituted "chap-
sentence; in Subsection (2), substituted the ter" for "act" in the first sentence and added the 
reference to Titlef62A, Chapter 11 for "Chapter second sentence in Subsection (2Xc); added 
45b of this title"in the first and second sen- Subsection (4); and made stylistic changes, 
tences; designated the former last sentence of Meaning of ' th is ac t " — The phrase "this 
Subsection (2) as Subsection (3) and substi- act" in Subsection (1) refers to Laws 1965, ch. 
tuted the department commences an action 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to 78-45a-17. 
78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing, 
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to delay 
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, and the 
alleged father to submit to genetic testing. 
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative or upon request made by or on 
behalf of any person whose blood is involved, order the mother, the chad, and 
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing. 
(3) If any party refuses to submit to those tests, the court may resolve the 
question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order if the rights 
of others and the interests of justice so require. 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-10.5 
.story: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7; 1992, ch. tence into two sentences, reversing their order 
§ 3. and substituting "genetic testing" for "blood 
nendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- tests* in both subsections and "request" for 
b, effective July 1, 1992, added the subsec- "suggestion* in Subsection (2); and made stylis-
designations; divided the former first sen- tic changes throughout the section. 
45a-10. Effect of genetic test results. 
.) If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by the 
lence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of 
child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. 
t) If the experts conclude that the genetic tests show the possibility of the 
ged father's paternity, admission of that evidence is within the discretion of 
court. 
I) (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic 
testing results in a paternity index of at least 100. 
(b) A presumption under this subsection may be rebutted in an appro-
priate action only by clear and convincing evidence. 
t) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the court may receive testi-
mony and genetic test results from genetic testing experts and others 
involved in conducting the genetic tests in the form of an affidavit 
(b) If any party objects to the court's receipt of the testimony or test 
results in affidavit form, that party may file a written objection with the 
court. The objection shall be filed within 30 days after service of the 
written test results on that party. Failure to timely file an objection under 
this subsection constitutes a waiver of that objection. 
story: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10; 1992, ch. disagree in their findings or conclusions, the 
§ 4. question shall be submitted upon all the evi-
nendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- dence"; substituted "genetic tests* for "blood 
t, effective July 1, 1992, designated the tests," deleted "depending upon the infrequency 
er first and third sentences as Subsections of the blood type" from the end, and made a 
tnd (2), respectively; deleted the former stylistic change in Subsection (2); and added 
id sentence which read: "If the experts Subsections (3) and (4). 
45a-10.5. Visitation rights of father. 
.) If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, it may upon 
own motion or upon motion of the father, order visitation rights in 
>rdance with Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37 as it considers appropriate 
er the circumstances. 
!) Visitation rights may not be granted to a father if the child has been 
sequently adopted. 
istory: C. 1953, 78-45a-10.5, enacted by came effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
*94, ch. 29, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
fective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 29 be-
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-4.3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Equitable estoppel. no evidence that the mother had attempted to 
Since courts are reluctant to use an equita- collect support from the natural father, even 
ble estoppel theory to impose a support obliga- though the stepfather had married the mother 
tion on a man who is not the biological father prior to the child's birth, and at one time had 
of a child, a stepfather was not equitably es- claimed the child as his own. Wiese v. Wiese, 
topped from denying liability where there was 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to A.L.R. — Stepparent's postdivorce duty to 
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child support stepchild, 44 A.L.R.4th 520. 
Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. Parental rights of man who is not biological 
859. or adoptive father of child but was husband or 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, cohabitant of mother when child was conceived 
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step- or born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655. 
parents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled 
by Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has primary obliga-
tion of support — Right of stepparent to recover 
support. 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural parent or adoptive 
parent of the primary obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has the 
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the natural or adoptive 
parent as any other obligee. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.2, enacted by L. Income withholding, §§ 62A-11-401 to 
1979, ch. 131, § 3. 62A-11-414. 
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
of this title. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cause of action for support. against her father for support. Fauver v. 
A minor child, via her guardian ad litem, Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
has standing to maintain a cause of action 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, parents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled 
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step- by Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
78-45-4.3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to support. 
Notwithstanding Section 78-45-2, a natural or an adoptive parent or step-
parent whose minor child has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the 
primary obligation to support that child until he reaches the age of majority. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
1983, ch. 120, § 1. of this title. 
Period of minority, § 15-2-1. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
CHAPTER 45e 
VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF 
PATERNITY 
Section Section 
78-45e-l. Chapter title. 78-45e-3. Requirements for filing. 
78-45e-2. Voluntary declaration of pater- 78-45e-4. Court rescission of the declara-
nity. tion. 
78-45e-l. Chapter title. 
This act is known as the "Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act." 
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-l, enacted by L. became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant tc 
1994, ch. 127, t 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 127 
78-45e-2. Voluntary declaration of paternity. 
(1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compliance with this 
chapter establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationship 
established when a child is born to persons married to each other. 
(b) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed, the liabilities oi 
the father include, but are not limited to, the reasonable expense of the 
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary 
support, and any fUneral expenses for the child. 
(c) When a father voluntarily declares paternity, his liability for past 
amounts due is limited to a period of four years immediately preceding the 
date that the voluntary declaration of paternity was filed. 
(2) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed it shall be recognized 
as a basis for a child support order without any further requirement or 
proceeding regarding the establishment of paternity. 
(3) The voluntary declaration of paternity may be completed and signed any 
time after the birth of the child. A voluntary declaration of paternity may not 
be executed or filed after consent to or relinquishment for adoption has been 
signed. 
(4) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall become an amendment to 
the original birth certificate. The original certificate and the declaration shall 
be marked so as to be distinguishable. The declaration may be included as part 
of subsequently issued certified copies of the birth certificate. Alternatively, 
electronically issued copies of a certificate may reflect the amended informa-
tion and the date of amendment only. 
(5) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall be in the form prescribed by 
the state registrar of vital statistics. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-2, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1,1995, deleted "during the 
1994, ch. 127, § 4; 1995, ch. 258, § 16. pregnancy or" before "after the birth" in the 
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amend- first sentence of Subsection (3). 
229 VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF PATERNITY 78-45e-4 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 127 
became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45e-3. Requirements for filing. 
A voluntary declaration of paternity may not be filed with the state registrar 
unless the declaration: 
(1) is signed by the birth mother and biological father, and by the legal 
guardian or a parent of a biological father who is under 18 years of age; 
and 
(2) includes a jurat, as defined in Section 46-1-2, for the biological 
mother and father, and an acknowledgment, as defined in Section 46-1-2 
for a guardian or parent who may be required to sign the declaration. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-3, enacted by L. became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
1994, ch. 127, § 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 127 
78-45e-4. Court rescission of the declaration. 
(1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity may be rescinded by order of a 
court of competent jurisdiction within 24 months after it was executed 
only: 
(i) upon a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the child is 
not the natural issue of the declared father; and 
(ii) if neither declarant has relinquished the child for adoption or 
terminated parental rights, 
(b) After the 24 month time period described in Subsection (a) has 
expired, a voluntary declaration of paternity becomes a conclusive pre-
sumption of paternity. 
(2) In determining whether to rescind the declaration the court has the 
same authority and obligation with regard to genetic testing as is provided in 
Section 78-45a-7. 
(3) A child support order based on the voluntary declaration of paternity 
remains in effect during the pendency of any proceeding under this section, 
and until a final order of the court rescinding the voluntary declaration. 
(4) If the declaration is rescinded, the declarant father may not recover any 
child support he provided for the child before entry of the order of rescission. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-4, enacted by L. became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
1994, ch. 127, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 127 
Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
20 
AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
23 
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ined, fundamental principles of due process 
>ply under the Utah Constitution, including 
e requirement of providing the defendant 
ith timely notice before hearings and copies of 
formation in the board's file. Labrum v. State 
3ard of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993). 
In original parole grant hearings at which 
-edicted terms of incarceration are deter-
ined, fundamental principles of due process 
ider this section impose the requirements 
iat the inmate know what information the 
oard of Pardons will be considering at the 
taring and that the inmate know soon enough 
, advance to have a reasonable opportunity to 
•epare responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies, 
urtis v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 958 
Jtah Ct. App. 1994). 
It was not a violation of an inmate's due 
rocess or double jeopardy rights for the Board 
'Pardons to refuse to grant him credit for time 
jrved as a condition of probation. Rawlings v. 
olden, 869 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
snied, 244 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 1994). 
Due process requirements of the Utah Con-
itution applied to a post-revocation parole 
rant hearing. Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 
Jtah 1994). 
An inmate is entitled to access to psychologi-
il reports to be considered by the Utah Board 
f Pardons in hearings at which the inmate's 
»lease date may be fixed or extended. Neel v. 
[olden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994). 
Defendant who failed to show how the fur-
ler participation of counsel at a hearing would 
ave affected the accuracy of the information 
Dnsidered by the Utah Board of Pardons was 
Utah Law Review. — State v. Ramirez: 
itrengthening Utah's Standard for Admitting 
lye witness Identification Evidence, 1992 Utah 
, Rev. 647. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — State 
Constitutions as a Source of Individual Liber-
ies: Expanding Protection for Abortion Fund-
ng Under Medicaid, 19 J. Contemp. L. 185 
1993). 
If the Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who is 
he Next Target? — An Examination of the 
entrapment Theory, 19 J. Contemp. L. 217 
1993). 
AXJl. — Laws regulating begging, panhan-
lling, or similar activity by poor or homeless 
>ersons, 7 A.L.R.5th 455. 
Validity and construction of "extreme indif-
ference" murder statute, 7 A.L.R.5th 758. 
Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings 
n prison proceedings, 9 A.L.R.5th 451. 
Rights as to notice and hearing in proceeding 
not denied due process by the Board's refusal to 
allow his counsel to address the Board. Neel v. 
Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994). 
Sentencing. 
Due process protections apply at the time of 
sentencing by the trial judge, whether the 
judge determines the actual number of years to 
be served, as in the federal courts and some 
state courts, or only whether to send the defen-
dant to prison, as is the case in Utah. The Utah 
Constitution certainly requires that equivalent 
due process protection be afforded when the 
Board of Pardons determines the actual num-
ber of years a defendant is to serve. Foote v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). 
Actions by a Board of Pardons member who 
waited until the sentencing hearing had com-
menced to announce recusal because she was a 
cousin of the murder victim, and then sat with 
the victim's family at the sentencing hearing in 
an apparent show of personal support, tainted 
the proceeding and violated the defendant's 
right to a fair hearing. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of 
Pardons, 839 P.2d 874 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Workers' compensation. 
The eight-year time limitation on temporary 
total disability benefits in the Worker's Com-
pensation Law is not an unconstitutional stat-
ute of repose. Stoker v. Workers' Comp. Fund, 
253 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1994). 
Cited in State v. Harrison, 805 R2d 769 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Adams, 830 P2d 
310 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Mincy, 838 
R2d 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
to revoke or suspend license to practice medi-
cine, 10A.L.R.5th 1. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
state statute requiring inmate to reimburse 
government for expense of incarceration, 13 
A.L.R.5th 872. 
Actions by state official involving defendant 
as constituting "outrageous" conduct violating 
due process guaranties, 18 A.L.R.5th 1. 
Validity and application of statute or regula-
tion authorizing revocation or suspension of 
driver's license for reason unrelated to use of, 
or ability to operate, motor vehicle, 18 
A.L.R.5th 542. 
Sufficiency, as to content, of notice of garnish-
ment required to be served upon garnishee, 20 
A.L.R.5th 229. 
Right to compensation for real property dam-
aged by law enforcement personnel in course of 
apprehending suspect, 23 A.L.R.5th 834. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Art. I, § 7 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 8 
community; trial by such a jury did not deprive 
defendant of the fundamental fairness guaran-
teed by the due process clause. State v. Alvarez, 
872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994). 
—Evidence. 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a 
tendency to influence the outcome of the trial 
by improper means, or if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, pro-
vokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise causes 
a jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions of the case. 
State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
—False testimony. 
Even though some of the testimony of two 
key witnesses was erroneous, because the ef-
forts of the prosecutor and defense attorney 
successfully dispelled the confusion the inaccu-
rate testimony may have created in the minds 
of jurors, the prosecutor was not required to 
stipulate that the testimony was false. State v. 
Gordon, 886 R2d 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
—Identification of defendant. 
For purposes of determining the due process 
reliability of eyewitness identifications under 
this section, an in-depth appraisal of the iden-
tification's reliability is required, and the court 
may consider fully the "totality of the circum-
stances" surrounding the identification. State v. 
Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (1991). 
In reviewing the trial court's decision to ad-
mit evidence of an identification of the accused, 
the Supreme Court will defer to the trial court's 
fact-finding role by viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's decision 
to admit and by reversing its factual findings 
only if they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence. State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 
10 (1991). 
Evidence based on observations independent 
of subsequent police misconduct was admis-
sible at trial. State v. Gurule, 856 R2d 377 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Interrogations. 
Recording of interrogations is not required 
under the Utah Constitution. State v. James, 
858 R2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Physical restraints. 
While compelling an accused to wear jail 
clothing furthers no essential state policy, com-
pelling an accused to be physically restrained 
furthers the essential state policy of providing 
security in the courtroom; courts have, there-
fore, recognized that the right to be tried with-
out physical restraints is subject to exception. 
State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering physical restraint of defendant who 
Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
—Selective enforcement. 
Plaintiffs' allegation of selective enforcement 
of the child sexual abuse laws because they 
were tried, convicted, and sentenced while oth-
ers who were convicted of the same crime went 
unpunished did not show a violation of plain-
tiffs' rights to equal protection of the law. At 
best, plaintiffs showed laxity in enforcement of 
the law, but laxity in enforcement of the law 
with respect to others is not a defense to en-
forcement of the law against plaintiffs. Herman 
v. State, 821 P.2d 457 (Utah 1991). 
—Self-representation. 
Denial of a capital defendant's proffered 
statement at the penalty phase of the trial 
violated his constitutional right of self-repre-
sentation and due process. State v. Young, 853 
R2d 327 (Utah 1993). 
Enforcement of foreign custody judgment. 
A mother was denied her due process rights 
by the trial court's enforcement of a foreign-
custody modification judgment of questionable 
jurisdictional validity without giving the 
mother reasonable notice and opportunity to be 
heard. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 R2d 157 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
Financial institution regulation. 
The seizure of a failing thrift institution by 
the commissioner of financial institutions pur-
suant to statutory requirements did not violate 
substantive or procedural due process. Brown v. 
Weis, 871 R2d 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
The University of Utah performs a govern-
mental function under the test developed in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (1980), and has immunity under § 63-30-
10(2), immunizing government entities from 
suit from injuries arising out of an assault or 
battery; the immunity act was not unconstitu-
tional as applied to a person who was injured 
when assaulted and struck by an employee of 
the University. Wright v. University of Utah, 
876 R2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
Notice of proceedings. 
Parties in a class action were entitled to 
notice of proceedings by a special master to 
review the reasonableness of attorney's fees 
and to participate in the proceedings. Plumb v. 
State, 809 R2d 734 (Utah 1990). 
Parole proceedings. 
The due process clause is applicable to the 
procedures and regulations of the state Board 
of Pardons, and its failure to develop an ad-
equate record of its determination of a habeas 
corpus petition was cause for remand. Neel v. 
Holden. 849 R2d 601 (Utah Ct Ann 1Q93} 
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Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 177. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 7 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries § 9 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or simi-
lar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal 
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373. 
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counter-
claim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321. 
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or 
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393. 
Automobiles: validity and construction of 
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-
ANALYSIS 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Actions by court. 
Actions by state. 





—Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Debt collection. 
District court jurisdiction. 
Election contest. 
Forum non conveniens. 
Injury or damage to property. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Land Registration Act. 
Limitations. 
—Limitations of actions. 
—Statutory limitation of review. 
Occupational disease law. 
Sovereign immunity. 
Torts. 
—Action by wife against husband. 
—Loss of consortium. 
Unlicensed law practice. 
Waiver of rights. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Cited. 
sion of operator's license for "habitual," "per-
sistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic reg-
ulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R4th 565. 
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory 
discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th 
1141. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce pro-
ceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from, 
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th 
1119. 
Key Numbers. — Jury «=> 9 et seq. 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et 
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts, 
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view 
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it 
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 
625 (Utah 1977). 
Trial court would not err in dismissing ac-
tion brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the 
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper 
case, but such dismissal should be without 
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his 
suit to another forum without harm to his 
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 
1977). 
Actions by court 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open pro-
bate proceeding and to proceed against bond of 
administratrix where she has practiced extrin-
sic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & 
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.LJR. 
1119 (1919). 
Actions by gitate. 
This section did not alter the law with re-
spect to certain rights which are vested in the 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
AH courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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state, which alone can exercise sovereign 
powers; therefore, it does not prevent the state 
from reserving to itself the sole right to bring 
actions for the dissolution of building and loan 
associations. Union Sav. & Inv. Co. v. District 
Court, 44 Utah 397, 140 P. 221, 1917A Ann. 
Cas. 821 (1914). 
Actions not created. 
This section does not create new rights, or 
give new remedies where none otherwise are 
given, but places a limitation upon Legislature 
to prevent that branch of the state government 
from closing the doors of the courts against any 
person who has a legal right which is enforce-
able in accordance with some known remedy. 
Therefore, where no right of action is given or 
no remedy exists, under either the common law 
or some statute, this section creates none. 
Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 
1916A L.R.A. 1140 (1915). 
Arbitration Act. 
The amendment of the arbitration statute to 
permit valid and enforceable agreements for 
arbitration of future disputes does not violate 
this section. Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. 
Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981V 
Assignments. 
In action for dairy products sold, plaintiff 
who was assignee of claim could bring action 
thereon even if claim was assigned for purpose 
of having action brought thereon. Perkes v. 
Utah Idaho Milk Co., 85 Utah 217, 39 P.2d 308 
(1934). 
Attorneys' duties. 
This section means that courts are open for 
the purpose of having any order or judgment 
assailed in the proper manner and at the 
proper time, so that attorney with reasonable 
cause may act in good faith and challenge an 
order he believes to be in excess of the court's 
jurisdiction. In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315,190 P. 
952 (1920). 
Criminal law. 
—Suspension of execution of death sen-
tence. 
Former section providing that no judge, tri-
bunal, or officer other than those mentioned 
therein could suspend execution of judgment of 
death except sheriff as provided in succeeding 
sections with reference to inquiry as to insan-
ity of defendant did not violate this section. 
State ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 
376, 49 P.2d 408 (1935). 
Debt collection. 
To collect past-due claim in court is right 
guaranteed by Constitution. Karenius v. Mer-
chants' Protective Ass'n, 65 Utah 183, 235 P. 
880 (1925). 
District court jurisdiction. 
The district courts are courts of general ju-
risdiction, and have original jurisdiction in all 
matters, civil and criminal, not excepted and 
prohibited bv the Constitution. Brady v. 
McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P. 188 (1921). 
District courts are courts of original jurisdic-
tion having jurisdiction in all matters not pro-
hibited by law or the Constitution, but one dis-
trict court cannot exercise power or control 
over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 92 Utah 137, 
66 P.2d 365 (1937). 
Election contest. 
There is no intimation herein that courts are 
given power to pass on purely political ques-
tions, but it is clearly stated that courts are 
always open for the enforcement of such rights 
and redress of such wrongs as from time imme-
morial have been considered as proper for 
courts to consider. The power to consider politi-
cal questions and the vindication of rights 
growing out of or incidental to such questions 
is not an inherent power of the courts. Courts 
can exercise powers respecting political mat-
ters only to the extent and in the manner pro-
vided by legislature, and election contest is not 
within jurisdiction of court of equity in absence 
of statute. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 
P. 1049 (1926). 
Forum non conveniens. 
Utah state courts may apply doctrine of 
forum non conveniens to actions arising under 
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Mooney v. 
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 
628 (1950). 
While courts have inherent power to refuse 
to exercise their jurisdiction when convinced 
that to do so would work hardship on some or 
all the litigants, the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens should be invoked only where it ap-
pears that plaintiff has selected an inconve-
nient forum for the purpose of annoying and 
harassing defendant, or where factors such as 
the location of the principal parties, ease of ac-
cess to proof, availability of witnesses, etc., so 
strongly preponderate in favor of holding the 
trial somewhere else that to deny a motion to 
dismiss would work great hardship on defen-
dant. Summa Corp. v. Lancer Indus. Inc., 559 
P.2d 544 (Utah 1977). 
Injury or damage to property. 
A right of action exists for any injury or 
damage to private property, and neither the 
legislature nor municipalities can interfere 
with that right. Lewis v. Pingree Nat'l Bank, 
47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C L.R.A. 1260 
(1915). 
Intoxicating liquor. 
The liquor nuisance sections of the former 
Liquor Control Act did not contravene this sec-
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i. Riggins v. District Court, 89 Utah 183. 51 
i 645 (1935). 
epriving a holder of a state liquor store 
>e of his liquor store without notice, hear-
, or any judicial review offends against both 
guarantee of due process and the guarantee 
ccess to the courts. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. 
ih Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293 
ah 1982). 
id Registration Act. 
he Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as 
ferring judicial powers on registrar of titles. 
iton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, 
P. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752 (1920). 
litations. 
brmer Section 78-15-3, a limitations provi-
I in the Utah Product Liability Act which 
red actions without regard to when an in-
Y occurred and was not designed to provide 
Basonable time within which to file a law-
t, was unconstitutional because it violated 
5 section and the constitutional prohibition 
inst abrogation of wrongful death actions, 
ry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 
d 670 (Utah 1986). 
'he former architects and builders statute of 
ose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional un-
this section because it did not provide an 
ired person with an effective and reason-
e alternative remedy for vindication of his 
her constitutional interest, and abrogation 
he remedy was arbitrary and unreasonable, 
i Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm 
ghes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989). 
lie former Utah architects and builders 
tute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconsti-
ional under this section because it denied a 
nedy for injury to one's person or property 
ised by a latent defect. Horton v. 
Idminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 
39). 
Subsection 78-12-25(3), which provides a 
ir-year statute of limitations on "an action 
relief not otherwise provided by law," does 
; violate this section. McHenry v. Utah 
lley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989). 
-imitation of actions. 
rhis section does not preclude the legislature 
m prescribing a statute of limitations for 
le within which to assail the regularity or 
janization of an irrigation district. Horn v. 
affer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P. 555 (1915). 
Statutory limitation of review. 
Former act authorizing improvement dis-
cts for water or sewage systems did not vio-
& this section on the ground that it limited 
prohibited review by the courts. Tygesen v. 
agna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127 
*50). 
Occupational disease law. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in ex-
cluding compensation for partial disability 
from silicosis, and in rendering remedy under 
that act exclusive so as to abrogate common-
law right of action therefor, was not unconsti-
tutional as depriving employee of his remedy 
by due course of law for injury done to his per-
son. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & 
Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, ap-
peal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 
L. Ed. 411 (1948). 
Sovereign immunity. 
Sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional 
under this section. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Torts. 
—Action by wife against husband. 
Doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does 
not bar wife's action against husband for the 
intentional infliction of personal injuries. 
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). 
—Loss of consortium. 
The Married Women's Act of 1898 (§ 30-2-4) 
was a reasonable legislative enactment in-
tended and reasonably tailored to place men 
and women on equal footing with respect to 
their ability to bring actions for their own inju-
ries and to extinguish the concept that a wife 
was the property of her husband. If, in the pro-
cess, the husband's right to sue for loss of his 
wife's consortium, which may have never ex-
isted in Utah, was abolished, that abolition 
was not an unreasonable step. Cruz v. Wright, 
765 P.2d 869 (Utah 1988). 
Unlicensed law practice. 
This section does not render unconstitutional 
statute making practice of law without a li-
cense a crime. Legislature has the power to 
declare acts of unauthorized practice of law to 
be illegal, and to punish violations thereof by 
fine and imprisonment. But the right to appear 
in person and prosecute or defend a cause to 
which one is a party cannot be abrogated ei-
ther by the Legislature or the courts. Nelson v. 
Smith, 107 Utah 382,154 P.2d 634,157 A.L.R. 
512 (1944). 
Waiver of rights. 
Right to apply to courts for redress of wrong 
is substantial right, and will not be waived by 
contract except through unequivocal language. 
Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 P. 16 
(1926). 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Employers are entitled to have recourse to 
courts under Workmen's Compensation Act 
concerning question of their ultimate liability. 
Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 
P. 825 (1918). 
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project did not unconstitutionally grant bene-
fits to private individuals; any benefits were 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-
mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
§ 9 to 23. 
• 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26. 
Key Numbers. — Franchises «=» 11. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri- 26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Age of majority. 
Agent for service of process. 
Automobile license law. 
Construction with Art. VI, § 26. 
Contract carrier permit. 






Disparate tax assessments. 
Excess revenue refunds. 
Guest statutes. 
Inheritance Tax Law. 
Insurance premium tax exemption. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Licenses. 
Massage parlor ordinance. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Notice requirements. 
Property. 
—Responsibility for water service. 
Public employees' retirement system. 
Public officers' bonds. 
Public officers' salaries. 
Road poll tax. 
School activities. 
Search warrants. 
Sunday closing laws. 
Tax sales. 
Unfair Practices Act. 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted. State v. 
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 
696 (1921). 
Objects and purposes of law present touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. & 
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 
(1941). 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such. 
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included, as 
compared to those excluded, provided differen-
tiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of 
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Before legislative enactment can be inter-
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas-
sification does not render statute unconstitu-
tional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimina-
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon unreason-
able distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948). 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legis-
lative Enactments — Torts, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 
292. 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Municipal Law, 1989 Utah L. 
Rev. 301. 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes 
§ 43 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 154. 
A.L.R. — Nonconsensual treatment of invol-
untarily committed mentally ill persons with 
neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs as violative 
of state constitutional guaranty, 74 A.L.R.4th 
1099. 
Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 71. 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others 
retained by the people. 
History: Const 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Parental rights to children. 
The right of a parent not to be deprived of 
parental rights without a showing of unfitness, 
abandonment, or substantial neglect is so fun-
damental and basic that it ranks among those 
rights referred to in this section. In re J.P., 648 
P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
To deprive a putative father and his child of 
the possible benefits of their relationship sim-
ply because the father filed a notice of his 
claim of paternity just a few hours after the 
mother and her grandfather had filed a peti-
tion for adoption would fly in the fact of funda-
mental fairness and due process. In re K.B.E., 
740 P.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Parental rights cannot be terminated by 
merely applying the "best interests of the 
child" standard, but, rather, there must be a 
showing of the parent's unfitness, abandon-
ment, or substantial neglect. T.R.F. v. Felan, 
760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Comment, The Utah 
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitu-
tion, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319. 




Constitutional Laws *= 
Sec. 26, [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory,] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless 
by express words they are declared to be otherwise. 
History: Const. 1896. 
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amended and supple-
mental pleadings, U.R.C.P. 15. 
Arbitration, § 78-3 la-1 et seq. 
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38. 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13. 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§§21-1-5, 78-6-14. 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of statement, U.R.C.P. 84. 
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22. 
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, 
U.R.C.P. 12(d). 
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23, 24. 
Numbered paragraphs, U.R.C.P. 10(b). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a). 
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A-
203. 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
hed, U.R.C.P. 65B(a). 
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
ANALYSIS 
formative defenses. 





-Election of remedies. 
-Estoppel. 
—Failure to plead. 
-Failure of consideration. 
—Failure to plead. 
—Pleading. 
-Failure to plead. 
—Affidavit opposing summary judgment. 
Denial. 
—Notice and opportunity. 
Waiver of defense. 
-Fraud. 
Necessary allegations. 
-Limitation of Landowner Liability Act. 
-Mitigation of damages. 
Failure to plead. 
Pleading. 
•—Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Pleading. 
—Statute of limitations. 




Claims for relief. 
—Amendment of pleading. 
—Attorney fees. 
—Essential allegations. 
Alienation of affections. 
—Request for alternative relief. 
—Sufficiency of complaint. 
Attachment of exhibit. 





—Election between claims. 
—Election of remedies under contract. 
—Res judicata. 
—Separate claims. 
Contract and quantum meruit. 
Defenses. 
—Lack of consideration. 
Effect of failure to deny. 
Purpose of rules. 
Cited. 
Statute of frauds, investment securities, 
§ 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201. 
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial 
Code, personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206. 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14. 
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a). 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103. 
Affirmative defenses. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
Pleading. 
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative de-
fense which must be pleaded in the answer in 
order to be raised; in action to recover wages 
and commissions allegedly due to plaintiff, 
where defendant did not raise the defense in 
his answer, he could not subsequently rely on 
it. Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 
202 (1968). 
Assertion of accord and satisfaction is gener-
ally raised by way of affirmative defense to an 
action on the original agreement, and when so 
raised, it must be properly pleaded. Sugar-
house Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 
(Utah 1980). 
Time limitation. 
In action to rescind loan secured by mort-
gage, where defendant mortgagee failed to an-
swer amended complaint within ten days after 
service thereof under Rule 15, but filed motion 
for permission to set forth accord and satisfac-
tion one week before trial, refusal was not 
abuse of court's discretion. Wasescha v. Terra, 
Inc., 528 P.2d 802 (Utah 1974). 
—Avoidance. 
Subdivision (c) recognizes that affirmative 
defenses include other matters "constituting 
an avoidance." A new matter becomes an 
"avoidance" when it suggests that a plaintiffs 
complaint is invalid for other reasons not em-
braced by the pleadings. Creekview Apts. ex 
rel. Hedman In vs., Inc. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
771 P.2d 693 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Consent. 
If a defending party contends he had the con-
sent of the complaining party to do the acts 
complained of, he must assert that defense as 
Subdivision (c) provides. Lignell v. Berg, 593 
P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). 
—Election of remedies. 
The defense of election of remedies is an af-
firmative one that must be raised by way of 
answer, motion, or demand and may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Royal Re-
sources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 
793 (Utah 1979). 
—Estoppel. 
Failure to plead. 
Although estoppel was an affirmative de-
fense which was not raised in the pleadings, 
where the evidence offered at trial supported 
the principle, the trial court's grant of motion 
to amend the pleadings to conform to evidence 
of estoppel would not be overturned absent a 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 8 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24 
showing of abuse of discretion. Big Butte 
Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977). 
Failure to plead an estoppel waives the de-
fense under Rule 12(h). Manger v. Davis, 619 
P.2d 687 (Utah 1980). 
—Failure of consideration. 
Failure to plead. 
Failure to pay consideration on a negotiable 
instrument is an affirmative defense which 
must be pleaded under Subdivision (c); and un-
less it is pleaded, it ordinarily will be consid-
ered waived as a defense pursuant to Rule 
12(h), unless there is a motion to amend, or the 
parties acquiesce in the trial of that issue, or 
the plaintiff is otherwise given notice and an 
opportunity to meet the issue. Olpin v. Grove 
Fin. Co., 521 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1974). 
Pleading. 
Lack of consideration means contract never 
existed; failure of consideration means contract 
existed but promised performance failed; lack 
of consideration negates element of plaintiff's 
case and must be pleaded under Subdivision 
(b), but failure of consideration raises issue 
outside plaintiffs prima facie case and must be 
pleaded under Subdivision (c). General Ins. Co. 
of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 
502 (Utah 1976). 
—Failure to plead. 
Affidavit opposing summary judg-
ment 
Defenses that have not been raised by the 
answer or by proper motion may not be raised 
in an affidavit in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment. Valley Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). 
Denial. 
Any matter that does not tend to controvert 
an opposing party's prima facie case must be 
pleaded specifically and is not put in issue by a 
denial made pursuant to Subdivision (b). Gen-
eral Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty 
Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976); Pratt v. 
Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977). 
Notice and opportunity. 
The purpose of Subdivision (c) is to provide 
the parties with notice of the issues raised and 
an opportunity to meet them, and, where a 
party has notice and opportunity, failure of the 
other to plead pursuant to this rule will not bar 
receipt of evidence on a defense. Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963). 
If the interests of justice so require and the 
opposing party is given a fair opportunity to 
meet the defense, the trial court may permit an 
affirmative defense that was not pleaded in the 
answer as required by Subdivision (c) to be 
tried. F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 
2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965). 
Waiver of defense. 
Because an affirmative defense raises mat-
ters outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie 
case, matters constituting such defenses must 
be pleaded, and are not put in issue by a denial 
pursuant to Subdivision (b) of this rule; failure 
to so plead constitutes waiver of the defense 
pursuant to Rule 12(h). Pratt v. Board of Educ, 
564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977). 
—Fraud. 
Necessary allegations. 
Defendants were not foreclosed from assert-
ing defenses based on fraud by their failure to 
use the term "fraud" or a derivative thereof or 
by their failure to allege every element of com-
mon-law fraud, when the substance of the acts 
constituting the alleged fraud had been 
pleaded. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 
(Utah 1985). 
—Limitation of Landowner Liability Act 
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act 
(§ 57-14-1 et seq.) constitutes an "affirmative 
defense" or an "avoidance" in a wrongful death 
action alleging negligence, and to preserve the 
act as a defense, it must be raised in the defen-
dant's answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irriga-
tion Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
—Mitigation of damages. 
Failure to plead. 
Failure to plead mitigation of damages did 
not result in an automatic waiver of the de-
fense where both the pleadings and the parties' 
opening statements at trial showed that the 
plaintiff was clearly aware that the issue of 
damages was the central one; the defendant 
was not precluded from introducing evidence of 
the plaintiffs failure to mitigate. Price-Orem 
Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 
P.2d 55 (Utah 1986). 
Pleading. 
An employer who wishes to obtain the ad-
vantage of the rule that a wrongfully dis-
charged employee is under an obligation to 
minimize damages, by seeking other employ-
ment, must raise the matter as an affirmative 
defense in his pleadings. Pratt v. Board of 
Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977). 
—Mutual mistake. 
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as 
it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima 
facie case, and the failure to assert it is a 
waiver of that defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
—Statute of frauds. 
Motion to dismiss. 
The defense of the statute of frauds is an 
affirmative defense which must be pleaded 
pursuant to Subdivision (c) and may not be 
raised by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b). W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 
Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970). 
Pleading. 
The statute of frauds is an affirmative de-
fense which must be set forth in the pleadings, 
else it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 
666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983). 
—Statute of limitations. 
——Applicability to plaintiffs. 
Rule that statutes of limitation generally 
must be pleaded or are waived usually applies 
to defendants only; this rule cannot hold plain-
tiff to same accountability; where, in quiet title 
action, defendant attacks validity of tax sale, 
only pleading available to plaintiff to assert 
statute of limitations is in reply, unauthorized 
under Rule 7(a) as matter of right, except in 
attacking counterclaim, and otherwise avail-
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able only by order of court. Hansen v. Morris, 3 
Utah 310, 283 P.2d 884 (1955); Thomas v. 
Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 
(1956). 
In action to quiet title, plaintiff holders of 
tax deed were not required to plead statute of 
limitations (§§ 78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3) and defen-
dants were not required to anticipate defense 
of statute of limitations where statute was first 
pleaded in plaintiff's reply to defendant's an-
swer asserting title. Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 
6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956). 
In action by water user challenging charges 
of water district, plaintiff waived thirty-day 
limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by failing to 
plead it in answer to defendant's counterclaim. 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 
375 P.2d 456 (1962). 
Pleading. 
The statute of limitations defense must be 
pleaded as an affirmative defense in a respon-
sive pleading, or it is waived, unless an 
amended pleading asserting the defense is al-
lowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 
15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irriga-
tion Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). 
Waiver. 
Statutes of limitation are not jurisdictional 
and can be waived. American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). 
—Waiver. 
Pleading of waiver not required in contract 
action against bank. See Titanium Metals 
Corp. of Am. v. Space Metals, Inc., 529 P.2d 
431 (Utah 1974). 
In action to rescind contract to purchase 
business on ground of fraud, defendant's claim 
that any fraud had been waived by plaintiffs 
continued operation of business was affirma-
tive defense which should have been pleaded, 
and failure to do so constituted waiver of de-
fense by virtue of Rule 12(h). Bezner v. Conti-
nental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 
1976). 
Claims for relief. 
—Amendment of pleading. 
Where pleading did not fulfill requirement of 
this rule but evidence supported the court's 
finding that defendant did owe amount de-
manded, failure of court to amend pleadings 
fully to this effect was nonprejudicial in view of 
Rule 15(b). Seamons v. Andersen, 122 Utah 
497, 252 P.2d 209 (1952). 
—Attorney fees. 
Absence of demand for attorney's fees in 
complaint does not preclude award of such fees 
by trial court. Palombi v. D & C Bldrs., 22 
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). 
—Essential allegations. 
Alienation of affections. 
A complaint contains the essential allega-
tions of a cause of action for alienation of affec-
tions when it alleges: (1) the fact of marriage, 
(2) that the defendant wilfully and intention-
ally alienated the wife's affections, resulting in 
the loss of the comfort, society and consortium 
of the wife, and (3) (to justify punitive dam-
ages) a charge of malice. Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 
Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954). 
—Request for alternative relief. 
An action for damages on a contract and a 
suit in quasi contract under the theory of quan-
tum meruit may be pleaded in alternative 
form. Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 
P.2d 642 (1957). 
—Sufficiency of complaint. 
Complaint need only give fair notice of na-
ture and basis or grounds of claim and indica-
tion of type of litigation; it is sufficient unless 
plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in sup-
port of claim. Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 
2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955). 
Attachment of exhibit 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part 
of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an 
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
of supplying necessary material averments nor 
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part 
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
Found not sufficient. 
Complaint did not state claim for relief from 
discrimination or arbitrary action where it al-
leged that plaintiff's land, zoned residential, 
was unsuitable for residential purposes, city 
refused to rezone, and zoning ordinance was 
oppressive, confiscatory and unlawful; relief 
required that health, safety, morals or general 
welfare of district and community would be 
promoted by permitting commercial or indus-
trial establishments in residential area. Dowse 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 
P.2d 723 (1953). 
Use of terms "fraud," "conspiracy" and "neg-
ligence" in complaint constituted general accu-
sations in the nature of conclusions of the 
pleader which, without the setting out of basic 
facts sufficient to constitute the charged ac-
tions, would not stand up against a motion to 
dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 
372 P.2d 990 (1962). 
Complaint claiming that there was a breach 
of the provisions of a title insurance policy, but 
which did not set out the particular provision 
or provisions claimed to have been breached, 
did not meet the requirements of Subdivision 
(a) and was properly dismissed. Ellis v. Hale, 
13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962). 
Complaint was insufficient where it con-
tained merely broad and general statements 
that false affidavit and false pleadings were 
filed and judges contacted, and that these ac-
tions prevented plaintiff from obtaining de-
fault judgment; proper complaint would have 
contained such allegations as contents, nature 
or substance of false statements and of conver-
sations between attorneys and judges. 
Heathman v. Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 
189 (1962). 
Complaint which simply averred that "de-
fendant made, declared and published to cer-
tain persons certain derogatory and libelous 
statements relating and pertaining to the 
plaintiff which tended to degrade and discredit 
him" was properly dismissed as not stating a 
cause of action for slander. Dennett v. Smith, 
21 Utah 2d 368, 445 P.2d 983 (1968). 
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) 
